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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty: Prize courts: Military salvage: International law: Salvage
by officers and crew of the disabled and abandoned vessel.-In The
Victoria, 1942 Am. Mar. Cas. 925 (S. D. N. Y. June 17, 1942), an Argen-
tine vessel had been torpedoed off the coast of North America, presumably
by a German submarine. A United States naval vessel picked up the crew
of the ship, which had been abandoned. The Victoria was later sighted, still
afloat, and her crew, aided by the personnel of the naval ship, succeeded in
putting her in running condition. From the one mishap, two questions face
the admiralty lawyer: (1) What are the rights of a vessel when so taken
into possession by a ship of war?' (2) When can the crew of a disabled
vessel libel her for salvage ?2
The Department of State announced that it would not seek salvage from
the ship or cargo, inasmuch as the vessel and cargo were under the flag of
a sister republic.3 The original libel filed by the members of the crew was
dismissed by judge Conger on the basis of international comity,4 and the
libellants were directed to bring an action in their own courts. Subsequently,
other members of the crew filed a libel based on new facts, viz., that the
Victoria was not returning to Argentina and that the crew had signed up to
sail on United Nations' vessels.5 judge Bright retained this libel, exercising
what seems to be a well reasoned discretion.
Salvage is generally spoken of as a reward given for the rescue of prop-
erty at sea. "Three elements are necessary to a valid salvage claim: 1. A
marine peril. 2. Service voluntarily rendered when not required as an
existing duty or from a special contract. 3. Success in whole or in part,
or that the service rendered contributed to such success." The object saved
must be a maritime object,7 it must be in imminent or actual danger of being
1See generally: Anderson, Military Salvage (1917) 17 J. Coanp. LEG. & INT. L. (N. s.)
233; COLOMBOs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE (1926); GARNER, PRIZE LAW DUR-
ING THE WORLD WAR (1927); HYDE, INTERNATIoNAL LAW (1922) § 891 et seq.;
KENNEDY, THE LAW OF CIVIL SALVAGE (3d ed. 1939) p. 1 et seq.; LAJTERPAMCT,
OPPENHI.'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1937) § 271. 34 U. S. C. c. 20, §§ 1131-58,
and (1908) Pnoc. Am. Soc. INT. L. 132; HARv. RE EARCHi INT. L. (1939), 33 Am. J.
INT. L. (July Supp.) 619.
2 RoBINsoN , ADMIRALTY (1939) § 98 et seq.; JONES, THE LAW OF SALVAGE (1870)
p. 19 et seq.31942 Am. Mar. Cas. 864. Cf. The Belgia, 71 Lloyd's List L. R. 21 (1941). England
does claim salvage from neutrals in such cases.
41942 Am. Mar. Cas. 925 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
51942 Am. Mar. Cas. 1170 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).6The Sabine, 101 U. S. 384 (1879).7There has been much litigation over what is a proper subject for salvage. See Note(1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 224. In Cape v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625, 72 Sup.
Ct. 336 (1887), salvage was denied for a floating dry-dock. At page 629, the court said:
". .. salvage is only spoken of in relation to ships and vessels and their cargoes, or
those things which have been committed to, or lost in, the sea or its branches ......
In the main case, the naval vessel performed a life salvage in picking up the Victoria's
crew. Generally, salvage does not lie for saving life at sea. However, 37 STAT. 242,
46 U. S. C. 729 (1912) provides for a reward out of the property saved along with
the saving of life. See ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 98.
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damaged or destroyed," and the aid or service rendered must not be merely
incidental or indirect.9 The salvor must also be without fault in causing the
peril to the disabled ship.10 The amount of the award varies, depending upon
the labor expended by the salvor, the promptitude, skill and energy he dis-
plays, the value of the property saved, the risk incurred by the salvor, and
the value of the salvor's property employed."
These are the general rules of "civil" salvage but they are also applicable
to "military" salvage, which differs from civil salvage in that the latter
involves an award for the recapture of property taken by an enemy, and is
such a service as may become the basis of a claim in a prize court.' 2
The district courts of the United States in a proper case sit a prize
courts. 18 The jurisdiction of a prize case, in the trial of captures made on
the high seas, jure belli, by a duly commissioned ship of war, belongs exclu-
sively to the courts of that nation to which the captor owes allegiance.14
Prize courts are not concerned with private or civil rights, but are instituted
for the purpose of trying the lawfulness of captures at sea, to prevent and
redress wrongful captures, and to justify rightful captures. 15
In order to constitute a capture, some act nust be done indicative of an
intention to seize and retain the vessel as prize,16 but it is not essential that
a full prize crew be put aboard the captured vessel if, under the circum-
stances, it appears that a prize master is sufficient to retain control of her.17
All captures jure belli are made for the government, and no title of prize
can be acquired except by an adjudication conferring title on the captors.' 8
While the property of an enemy can lawfully be captured as prize, the prop-
erty of a neutral cannot rightfully be captured, provided he observes his
STalbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1 (U. S. 1801). If the vessel is not in danger, any
service rendered is not a salvage service. See Bond v. Bull S.S. Co., 13 F. (2d) 893
(S. D. Tex. 1926).9 Merritt & Chapman Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 611, 47 Sup. Ct. 663 (1927).
'0The Clarita, 23 Wall. 1, 18 (U. S. 1874). But where a tug is not at fault in
causing damage sustained by its tow, salvage may be awarded, because the contract of
towage does not imply a duty to rescue the tow. Ford Motor Co. v. Manhattan Lighter-
age Co., 97 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
"lThe Blackwall, 10 Wall. 1, 14 (U. S. 1869).
12See KENNEDY, op. cit. supra note 1. For a discussion of salvage awards by and
against government owned ships, see ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 102, and 46
U. S. C. § 741 et seq.
13Gtass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 DalI. 6 (U. S. 1794). Prize money has been abolished
in the United States. 30 STAT. 1007, 34 U. S. C. 1151 (1899). That is, the crew of a
naval ship take nothing. See (1907) 1 Am. J. INT. L. 483.
'
4The Alerta, 9 Cranch 359 (U. S. 1815) ; L'Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238 (U. S. 1816).
'
5 Cushing v. Laird, 107 U. S. 69, 76, 2 Sup. Ct. 196, 201 (1883). Capture as prize of
war, Jure belli, overrides all previous liens. The Battle, 6 Wall, 498 (U. S. 1867) ; The
Carlos F. Ruses, 177 U. S. 655, 20 Sup. Ct. 803 (1900). In the last case there was a
claim by a neutral as owner of the cargo. The claim was denied. Cf., prior liens are
not extinguished by government confiscation for smuggling. The Thomaston, 26 F.
(2d) 279 (D. Md. 1928).
10The Grotius, 9 Cranch 368 (U. S. 1815).
17The Alexander, 8 Cranch 169 (U. S. 1814).
'SThe Mary Ford, 3 Dall. 188 (U. S. 1796); The Dos Hermanos, 10 Wheat. 306, 310
(U. S. 1825), limiting the libellant's claim to an award "... in the nature of salvage
for bringing in and preserving the property."
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neutrality.'0 The libel in prize must state the title of the ship, generally
determined by the flag under which she is sailing and the papers accompany-
ing her, and if it appears that the vessel is neutral, and is not violating her
neutral character by carrying contraband, or in some other manner, restitu-
tion must be ordered. 20
"Military" salvage consists of the rescue by government forces of national
or of neutral vessels from the enemy in time of war. This means a recapture
of a vessel the title to which has not been adjudicated by a lawfully consti-
tuted prize court; for after such an adjudication the rights of the prior
owner are cut off. If the vessel recaptured prior to adjudication is one
belonging to a neutral, salvage is generally not awarded, because it is con-
sidered that even the courts of the captor's nation would have restored the
ship, and thus no benefit is deemed to have been conferred on the vessel.2 1
When the would-be captor does not complete the capture, but attempts rather
to destroy the ship, the award is more in the nature of civil salvage, as for
preserving and bringing a derelict into port.22
While in modern warfare the importance of prize law is nearly nil,23 one
incident has occurred in this war, where, had the United States been at war
with Germany at the time, the law of prize might have been applied. The
German steamship Odenwald was flying an American flag when overtaken
by a United States cruiser on November 6, 1941. The Germans abandoned
the ship after attempting to scuttle her, and the crew of the cruiser repaired
the engines and took the ship into port. The captain and crew of the cruiser
'
0 The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377 (U. S. 1866); The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch
64 (U. S. 1804) ; The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28 (U. S. 1866) ; The Victory, Fed. Cas. No.
16,938 (D. Mass. 1863). Where as between captor and original owner the capture was
lawful, but a neutral subsequently was given the ship by the captor prior to an adjudi-
cation and sale of the ship, the donee was held to be unable to take more than was
consistent with his neutral character. The Adventure, 8 Cranch 221 (U. S. 1814)
Miller v. The Resolution, 2 Dall. 1 (Fed. Ct. App. 1781).20The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377 (U. S. 1866) ; Miller v. The Resolution, supra
note 19; Cushing v. Laird, 107 U. S. 69, 2 Sup. Ct. 196 (1882).21See COLOMBos, op. cit. mipra note 1, at 288, and cases therein. Cf., Talbot v. See-
man, 1 Cranch 1 (U. S. 1801), where salvage was awarded when it appeared that the
French courts were condemning all ships carrying British products, the recapture being
considered a beneficial service. Accord: The Pontoporos, [19161 P. 100.
30 STAT. 1007, 34 U. S. C. 1158 (1899) provides in part: "When any vessel or other
property shall have been captured by any force hostile to the United States, and shall
be recaptured, and it shall appear to the court that the same has not been condemned
as prize before its recapture, by any competent authority, the court shall award a meet
and competent sum as salvage, according to the circumstances of each case." It does
not appear whether the naval forces share in the award. See, however, The Odenwald,
accounted in (1942) 36 Ams. J. INT. L. 96.
55 STAT. 645, 46 U. S. C. 732 (1941) (amended H. R. 6356, Feb. 10, 1942) enables
the Secretary of the Navy to provide salvage facilities during an emergency or in
wartime.22The Mary Ford, 3 DalI. 188 (U. S. 1796). It has been suggested that where the
recaptured vessel must be repaired to prevent its sinking or to enable it to be brought
into port, civil salvage can be added onto military salvage. Anderson, Military Salvage
(1917) J. ComnP. LEG. & LEG. INT. L. (N. s.) 233, 236.
2 3 0nly one case of capture was reported in the last war. The Pontoporos, [1916]




filed a libel for civil salvage, and the owners defaulted. Subsequently the
vessel was requisitioned by the Maritime Commission.
24
Turning now to the other question of the main case, we consider civil
salvage by the crew of a disabled vessel. An English case decided recently
may have some bearing on the disposal of the libel retained by Judge Bright.
In The Albionic, [1942] W. N. 48, the ship caught fire and the captain
and part of the crew took to the lifeboats. No order was given to abandon
the ship,25 however, and the chief officer in fact forbade the members of the
crew still aboard to leave the ship. The Court of Appeal ruled that the crew
was not entitled to salvage, since they were not volunteers. To dissolve the
contract of service, there must be an actual abandonment on the order of
the captain. The Albionic illustrates the seaman's difficulty in making out a
case, for in general, where a claim for salvage is made by one who has a
duty to stand by and protect the ship, the claim will be dismissed. 0
The leading definition of a salvor is given by Lord Stowell in The Nep-
tune:27 "What is a salvor? A person who, without any particular relation
to a ship in distress, proffers useful service, and gives it as a volunteer ad-
venturer, without any preexisting covenant that connected him with the duty
of employing himself for the preservation of that ship. .... '"28 Yet, where
the duty has been severed, the officers and crew of a disabled vessel are en-
titled to salvage, and whether the seaman is entitled to the reward is a ques-
tion of fact in each case.
Where the service rendered by the crew member has been beyond his line
of duty, or extraordinary, he is entitled to claim an award for the benefit he
has bestowed on the vessel.29 It is against public policy to encourage those
who owe a duty to the ship to abandon their duty in the hope of collecting
a higher compensation,"° but it is not against public policy to 6ncourage a
seaman to go beyond his contractual duty to salvage property at sea.31 For
24 An account of the incident may be found in (1942) 36 Am. J. INT. L. 96.25In the main case, the master did order the crew to abandon the Victoria. 1942 Am.
Mar. Cas. 1170 at 1171. The Albionic is clearly distinguishable from the libel filed by
the crew of the Victoria, on the basis of the facts set forth by Judge Bright.
26The Connemara, 108 U. S. 352, 358, 2 Sup. Ct. 754 (1883); The Clarita, 23 Wall.
1, 17 (U. S. 1874) ; Gilbraith v. Stewart Trans. Co., 121 Fed. 540 (C. C. A. 7th 1902) ;
The Nebraska, 75 Fed. 598 (C. C. A. 7th 1895); The C. P. Minch, 73 Fed. 859
(C. C. A. 2d 1894).271 Hagg. Adm. 227, 236 (1824).
280f those who owe a duty to the ship, the captain's is the greatest, that of the crew
is somewhat less, while that of the passenger is least. See, The Cuba, Fed. Cas. No.
13,549 (S. D. N. Y. 1861).29The Neptune, supra note 25; The Hope (Hobart v. Dragon), 10 Pet. 108 (U. S.
1836); The Two Catherines, Fed. Cas. No. 14,288 (D. R. I. 1821) ; The Ocean Star,
Fed. Cas. No. 11,908 (S. D. Fla. 1860); The Pontiac, Fed. Cas. No. 8,801 (D. Ohio
1852); The Mary Hale, Fed. Cas. No. 9,213 (S. D. Fla. 1856).
30The Clarita, 23 Wall. 1, 17 (U. S. 1874).31In The Clarita, id. at 17, it was said: "Seamen belonging to the ship in peril can-
not, as a general rule, claim salvage compensation, not only because it is their duty
to save both ship and cargo ... but because it would be unwise to tempt them to let
the ship and cargo get into a position of danger in order that by extreme exertion
they might claim salvage compensation." See, The Florence, 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 607
(1853), at page 609: ". . . there is a limit to the risk to which any seaman is bound to
expose himself." See also, The Hope, 10 Pet. 108, 120 (U. S. 1836).
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example, where the officers and crew recapture the ship from a prize crew,
except for one case,32 they have been held to be entitled to salvage from the
ship and cargo.33  Similarly, extraordinary services in preserving a ship-
wreck,84 or in crossing the Gulf of Mexico in an open boat to summon aid,3 5
have been held worthy of salvage. In the last analysis, the libellant in these
cases substantially stands in the same position as a third person who has
never had any connection with the ship. The seaman whose contract has been
dissolved can also salvage the ship, for as to such seaman the voyage has
ended, and he no longer owes a duty under his contract to perform services
for the ship. Where, for example, the captain had discharged the seaman,
he was held to be entitled to salvage.36 Pilots who have completed their
assignment may likewise come to the aid of the vessel and claim a salvage
reward for their services.3 7 There is a conflict as to whether a shipwreck
destroys the contract, but the weight seems to favor the allowance of sal-
vage in such a case.38
The current wartime cases no doubt will involve the question whether the
seaman's duty has been terminated by an abandonment, and the issue of
abandonment will then be of primary importance. To constitute such an
abandonment as 'will terminate the relationship between the ship and her
officers and crew, the ship must be deserted on the order of the captain,
and in any event with no intent to return.3 9 If there is no evidence of a
82Phillips v. McCall, Fed. Cas. No. 11,104 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1821) (captain ran-
somed the ship from captors).33Le Tigre, Fed. Cas. No. 8,281 (C. C. D. N. J. 1821) (libel by revenue officer for
retaking the ship); The Cuba, Fed. Cas. No. 13,549 (S. D. N. Y. 1861) ; The Harmony,
Fed. Cas. No. 2,871 (C. C. D. Pa. 1807). JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21.34The Two Catherines, Fed. Cas. No. 14,288 (C. C. D. R. I. 1821); The Aguan,
48 Fed. 320 (S. D. N. Y. 1891).3
aThe Mary Hale, Fed. Cas. No. 9,213 (S. D. Fla. 1856).
36 The Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240 (U. S. 1804).37The Hope, 10 Pet. 108 (U. S. 1836).3 8 Cases allowing salvage where there has been a shipwreck: The Two Catherines,
Fed. Cas. No. 14,288 (C. C. D. R. I. 1821) ; The John Taylor, Fed. Cas. No. 2,482 (E. D.
La. 1842) ; The Aguan, 48 Fed. 320 (S. D. N. Y. 1890). The libel is against the prop-
erty saved from the wreck.
Cases contra: The Ocean Star, Fed. Cas. No. 11,908 (S. D. Fla. 1860); Read v.
Hussey, Fed. Cas. No. 11,646 (S. D. N. Y. 1836) (crew contracted to be paid from
the proceeds of the voyage).39 The Georgiana, 245 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 1st 1917); The C. P. Minch, 73 Fed. 859
(C. C. A. 2d 1896) (libel dismissed); The Umatilla, 29 Fed. 252 (N. D. Cal. 1886).
Where there is an intent to return to the ship by those who left her, those who stay
aboard cannot recover salvage. The John Perkins, Fed. Cas. No. 7,360 (D. Mass. 1857).
An arrest of the ship does not constitute a termination of the captain's duties. The
Nebraska, 75 Fed. 598 (C. C. A. 7th 1895). See also, The Cate, Fed. Cas. No. 13,786
(D. Ct. Pa. 1806).
An abandonment by the owner of the ship to the insurer does not alter the duties
of the officers and crew to the ship and cargo. The C. F. Bielman, 108 Fed. 878 (E. D.
Wis. 1901).
In Danielson v. Libbey, 114 Wash. 340, 195 Pac. 37 (1921), it was held that to
constitute an abandonment, the ship must be in danger at sea, and in good faith, with
no intent to return, all hands must leave the ship on the order of the officer in charge.
Cf., The Triumph, Fed. Cas. No. 14,183 (D. Mass. 1858), where the cook was deserted
by the rest of the crew, he was held entitled to a salvage reward, on the grounds that
1942]
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final abandonment, a salvage libel will be dismissed.40 Yet where the ship
is 'ordered abandoned, and is thought to be in imminent danger of sinking,
a few who remained aboard and ultimately saved the ship were awarded
salvage. 4' Where a part of the abandoning crew lost its way, and returned
to the ship and saved her, salvage was given to them.42
It seems clear that the decision in The Albionic was correct, and the claim
for salvage properly denied.43 The principles of la*¢ are well settled; the
difficulty lies in their application to a given situation, and seldom are two
cases found which are exactly alike. In view of the numerous shellings,
torpedoings and abandonments in this war, it is reasonable to conclude that
the problem of libel by a ship's crew will arise many times before the war
is over.
Reginald S. Oliver
Conflict of Laws: Constitutional law: Multiple inheritance taxation of
intangibles.'--E. H. Harkness, of New York, held 10,000 shares of common
stock and 400 shares of preferred stock of the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, a Utah corporation. The corporation kept its stock books, records, and
transfer agents in New York and maintained none in Utah. The certificates
representing these shares were never within Utah but were in the possession
of Harkness in New York at the time of his death. The Supreme Court,
expressly overruling First National Bank v. Maine," held that Utah may
constitutionally impose a tax upon the transfer by death of shares of stock
held by a non-resident in a Utah corporation. Utah v. Aldrich, - U. S. -,
62 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1942).
his contract had been terminated.
In The Superior, 270 Fed. 283 (E. D. N. Y. 1920), the crew of a Norwegian vessel
libelled her for salvage. It was held that the law of Norway applied, although under
the general rules there had not been a sufficient abandonment to authorize a salvage
award.40The C. P. Minch, 73 Fed. 859 (C. C. A. 2d 1896).41The Umatilla, 29 Fed. 252 (N. D. Cal. 1886).42The Georgiana, 245 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 1st 1917).43The author does not wish it to be inferred that he is expressing an opinion on the
merits of the libel of the ship Victoria.
'It is the purpose of this note to examine the present law concerning the extent to
which several states may constitutionally tax the transfer by death of intangible property.
Problems concerning the levying of ad valorem taxes on the property itself, and the
taxing of income derived from such property are not relevant to the present study. For
an excellent note dealing with recent developments in these latter problems, see Note
(1941) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 345, where the writer concludes that "the only way to avoid
double taxation of trust property seems to lie in keeping the res, the trustee, and the
beneficiary within the bounds of a single state."
2284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 77 A. L. R. 1401 (1932). The decision states that
the First National Bank case ". . . should not survive. We overrule it." This does
not mean that the present holding shifts a single taxing power from Harkness' domiciliary
state, New York, to Utah, the state of incorporation; but, rather, the decision adds a
second taxing power. "In the case of shares of stock, jurisdiction to tax is not restricted
to the domiciliary state." (italics added).
[Vol. 28
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The principal case has been describedas "the most confusing and shocking
to estate owners within the past decade".3 Such a description may be war-
ranted if the decision is regarded as a sudden "about-face" from the principles
of taxing jurisdiction which were expounded in the overruled case. The
"about-face" is not, however, as abrupt as in Erie v. Tompkins. In the light
of recent decisions of the Supreme Court,4 the holding must be regarded as
a judicial "next step". The Court has merely stretched its recently expanding
concept of taxing jurisdiction within which the several states may constitu-
tionally reach intangibles.5
The working philosophy for taxation as a quid pro quo for benefits rendered
to property is on firmer ground in dealing with corporeal things which occupy
space in some sovereign territory. "Situs" of things having a physical exist-
ence is a comprehensible concept, but the philosophy has its test in respect
to "[i]ntangibles, which are legal relationships between persons and which
have no geographical location.. . ." They are the trapeze upon which judges
practice legal gymnastics. Fictional concepts of corporeality give intangibles
a situs for some purposes,7 but the older fiction of mobiliter sequunter per-
sonam causes them to follow their owner about like "Mary's Little Lamb".
If the owners of intangibles, in fact, receive protection and benefits from
several states, do they thereby submit themselves to the taxing jurisdictions
of their several benefactors.? Until the Aldrich case, there had been no little
confusion in the Supreme Cofirt's answer to this question. Up to a decade
ago, the Supreme Court had shown a willingness to believe that even in-
tangible wealth was subject to death transfer taxation by only one jurisdiction.
Now, by the Aldrich case, the possibilities of simultaneous taxation by several
3Barrons, The National Financial Weekly (June 29, 1942).4Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939) ; Graves v. Elliott, 307
U. S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939). In Graves v. Schmiddlapp, - U. S. -, 62 Sup.
Ct. 870 (1942), overruling Wachovia Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 56, 47 Sup. Ct.
202 (1926), the Court held that New York could tax the exercise of a general testa-
mentary power of appointment by a resident donee under the will of a non-resident donor,
the intangibles constituting the trust being held outside of New York.
'As stated by the majority in the principal case at page 1011: "If we raised a consti-
tutional barrier in this case after having let it down in the Curry case, we would indeed
be drawing neat legal distinctions and refinements which certainly cannot be divined
from the language of the Constitution."
GGraves v. Schmidlapp, supra note 4 at 873.
7The UNIF. STOCK TRANSFER AcT (Rev. Stat. 1933 §§ 18-3-1 et seq.) merges the
share into the certificate. Appellee in the principal case'vainly argued that since Utah
had adopted the Act, there was no need to invoke the Utah law to effect a complete
transfer of decedent's interest. For a discussion dealing with the situs of shares issued
under the Act, for the purposes of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, see Note (1939) 87 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 700.
SThe common law rules of jurisdiction over intangibles are set forth in RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 50-53. A special note to § 50, however, states: "These
sections do not purport to state the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon the exercise of the jurisdiction to tax by the various states." For
a general discussion of these conflicting bases of jurisdiction, see BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws (1935) 567-602. BEALE, op. cit. .upra at 602-619, discusses the inheritance tax-
ation of intangibles. Although the analysis of problems is still valuable as a starting
point, the conclusions reached have fallen with the authority on which they were founded.
1942]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
states are boundless, at least so far as the constitutionality of such multiple
taxation is concerned.9
Recent decisions, in line with the Aldrich case, when viewed 'collectively,
do not evidence startling new propositions of constitutional -law concerning
the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the taxing powers of the several
states.'0 Rather, they have revivified much ancient, previously distinguished,
and overruled authority.-' In a word, the Court has reverted to the principles
once expounded by Mr. Justice Holmes-"the man who liked to pay taxes.'
u2
In Blackstone v. Miller,1 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
permitted New York to exact a transfer tax on the amount of a New York
bank deposit of an Illinois decedent. Justice Holmes made it clear that he
did not rely on the state court's finding that the debt had a taxable situs in
New York. New York, he said, had imposed a tax "on the tran4er, not
on the deposit . . ." (italics added). 14 This transfer "depends upon the law
of New York, not because of any theoretical speculation concerning the where-
abouts of the debt, but because of the practical fact of its power over the
person of the debtor."' 5
Compare with this the following excerpt from the principal case: "... free-
dom of transfer ... stems from Utah law .... It is a benefit which Utah has
bestowed. For it alone Utah may constitutionally ask a return."' 6 The under-
lying philosophy of both cases is identical: "The universal succession is taxed
in one state, the singular succession is taxed in another. The plaintiff has
to make out her right under both in order to get the money."1 Indeed, the
Blackstone case and the principal case might very well have been decided
by the same court on the same day.
Justice Holmes' "benefit" theory of taxing jurisdiction, however, did not
long remain the order of the day. His premise that something conferred by
a state upon a stranger gives that state power to exact a quid pro quo was
abandoned by a majority (whose decisions are all reviewed in the principal
9
"No one can give assurance that any intangibles are not currently subject to double
taxation." Barron's, supra note 3.
'OAs stated in the Schmidlapp case, supra note 4 at 873: the "benefit-burden" theories
of taxing jurisdiction "were not novel propositions when they were restated in the
McCanless and Elliott cases. . . ." (citing cases).
"lPrior to the Maine case, it was well established that the-state in which the company
was incorporated could tax the transfer of shares held by a non-resident. GoORIlCx,
CONFLICr OF LAws (2d ed. 1938) 128, n. 205. As the majority opinion in the Aldrich
case points out: ". . . we restore these intangibles to the constitutional status which they
occupied up to a few years ago." *[citing cases collected in Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 365
et seq.].
12 PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (3d Series, 1940) at vi. See also, TaE
DISSENTING OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, arranged by Alfred Lief (1929), espe-
cially Chapter V, "On Escaping Taxes". See Mr. Justice Jackson's comment on the
present case as stated in note 18, infra.
13188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903), overruled in Farmer's Loan Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 A. L. R. 1000 (1930).
'
4Blackstone v. Miller, supra note 13 at 203.
15Ibid. at 205. Since a debtor may ordinarily be sued in any state where he is found
and served, Justice Holmes' argument, if pushed far enough, supports a multiplicity of
taxation beyond that recognized by the Aldrich case.
16. U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 at l01ll,1 7 Blackstone v. Miller, supra note 13 at 207.
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case) which insisted that there must be something with a real or fictional situs
within the taxing jurisdiction.1 8 This interpretation of taxing jurisdiction
had been worked out earlier in decisions such as Frick v. Pennsylvania,',
which held that double taxation of tangible personal property, permanently
situated in a state other than the owner's domicile, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, the doctrine of mobiliter sequuntur personam made
it certain that all intangibles would be subject to at least one transfer tax-
that which the state of the decedent's domicile could constitutionally exact.2 0
The judges who established this line of cases asked, as a matter of logic, what
sufficient reason existed "for saying [intangibles] are not entitled to enjoy
an immunity against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded
to tangibles?"21 Seeing none, they then decided that the one state which
should be allowed to exact this single levy was the state of the decedent's
domicile, whose laws govern all rights of succession to the universitas of his
estate.22 Finally, they considered that competition among the several states
for estate tax revenue was not consonant with the nature of our federal
system.23  Justice Holmes dissented with his customary vigor as the Court
strayed from his liberal interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Now,
with the Aldrich case, the Court completes its circuitous route from the
Blackstone case, 24 and these dissenting opinions of Justice Holmes constitute
most of the foundation upon which the recent trends are being constructed.2 5
'
8 These conflicting major premises pervade the whole problem. Excellent arguments
springing from each of these premises are illustrated in the Farmer's Loan case, supra
note 13. Justice Holmes dissented'vigorously, p. 218, to the overruling of his Blackstone
opinion. Emphasizing the unimportance of situs, he stated that the right to tax existed
because: "The party needs the help of Minnesota to acquire a right, and that state can
demand a quid pro quo in return." Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in the principal case,
answers this "benefit-burden" theory of jurisdiction as follows: "I am the very real
debtor [of the several states for protection, food, etc.], but am frank enough to say that
I hope not a potential taxpayer, of all." 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 at 1021.
19268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 42 A. L. R. 316 (1925). See also, Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905). Although these cases
explicitly distinguish the taxation of intangibles from the taxation of tangibles, the
majority in the Farmer's Loan case, supra note 13, after stating the rule as to tangibles,
concluded: ". . . existing conditions no less imperatively demand protection of choses in
action against multiplied taxation . .. the trend of decisions here has been in that
direction."201n First National Bank v. Maine, supra note 2 at 328, the Court, having decided that
only one state could tax the transfer of shares, concluded that the proper state to tax,
according to precedent, could be found only by the application of the fiction.21Farmer's Loan v. Minnesota, supra note 13 at 212.22Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916).231bid.' at 209. "The inevitable tendency of that view [Blackstone case, etc.] is to
disturb good relations among the states and produce the kind of discontent expected to
subside after establishment of the Union. The Federalist VII."24The case of First National Bank v. Maine, supra note 2, overruled by the principal
case, was the half-way mark on the circuitous route which the Court followed. De-
nouncing those cases which "give countenance to the general doctrine that intangible
property (unlike tangible property) might be subjected to a death transfer tax in more
than one state," the majority (6-3) reduced their importance to "historic interest".25For example, in the principal case, both the majority and concurring opinions accept
as present law the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment which Justice Holmes




The United States Supreme Court now gives the several states a "blank
check", signed by the estate of a decedent holding shares in a foreign cor-
poration, and payable to the state which granted the corporate charter.2 6
Armed with all the newly regained taxing powers which flow from the revived
"benefit-burden" theory of taxing jurisdiction, the several states are free to
declare an open season on non-resident investors 2  No longer can refuge be
sought in the Fourteenth Amendment; the investor must protect himself by
limiting his security holdings to those states which refuse, either absolutely
or on a reciprocal basis, to tax intangibles owned by non-residents.
28
Douglas S. Moore
Criminal Law: Accomplices: Sufficiency of corroboration under Section
399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.- Irving Nftzberg was convicted
of murder in the first degree. Abraham Reles, a self-confessed accomplice,'
was the chief witness for the People. The prosecution introduced six persons
to corroborate the testimony of Reles, all of whom were non-accomplice wit-
nesses.2 None. of their evidence involved the identification of the defendant.
.
2 GUnder the decision of the principal case, more than one state may be the payee of
this blank check. As the dissenting opinion points out: "... . if the decedent owned stock
in consolidated corporations incorporated in several states, .. .under this decision stocks
of some consolidated railroads would be subject to tax on their full values by five or six
states." It is to be noted, however, that the several states may not tax the transfer of
shares held by a non-resident in a foreign corporation simply because the corporation
does business or owns property within their jurisdiction. Rhode Island Hospital v.
Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256, 43 A. L. R. 1374 (1926).27
"In line with our recent decisions in Curry v. McCanless, Graves v. Elliott and
Graves v. Schmidlapp, we repeat that there is no constitutional rule of immunity from
taxation of intangibles by more than one state." 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 at 1012.
28A recent survey by Barron's, supra note 2, discloses that all of the large "financial
states" have laws which prevent (subject to various conditions) the exercise of the
plenary taxing power made available by the principal case. In New York, this pro-
hibition is embodied in ART. XVI, § 3 of the Constitution, as amended in 1938. For a
note dealing with reciprocity provisions of succession tax laws, see Note (1930) 69
A. L. R. 949.
'An accomplice is a competent witness for the prosecution. People v. O'Neil, 10
N. Y. St. Rep. 1, 48 Hun. 36, aff'd, 109 N. Y. 251, 16 N. E. 68 (1888).
To constitute an accomplice one must be so connected with the crime that at common
law he might have been convicted as the principal or as an accessory before the fact.
People v. Jackerson, 247 N. Y. 36, 159 N. E. 715 (1928) ; People v. Clougher, 246
N. Y. 106, 158 N. E. 106 (1927) ; People v. Richardson, 222 N. Y. 103, 118 N. E. 913
(1914); People v. Sweeney, 213 N. Y. 37, 106 N. E. 913 (1914).
The evidence of accomplices alone is sufficient to establish that a crime has been
committed. People v. Sweeney, 161 App. Div. 221, 146 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st Dep't 1914)
aff'd, 213 N. Y. 37, 106 N. E. 913 (1914).2The testimony of these six witnesses embodied the following facts: (1) visits at a
so-called hideout apartment of a third person; (2) location of the pot of duty of a
traffic officer; (3) deceased had been in communication with a police inspector; (4)
vehicle in which the victim's body was found had been stolen some months earlier from




The trial judge was requested by the defendant to instruct the jury that facts
sworn to by the non-accomplice witnesses were "insufficient evidence to corro-
borate the accomplice." The judge charged that the testimony did not tend to
connect the defendant with the crime, but that it was "intended to corroborate
the witness as to whether or not he is telling the truth."3 Counsel for the
defendant took exceptions. People v. Nitzberg, 287 N. Y. 183, 38 N. E. (2d)
490. rearg. denied, 287 N. Y. 754, 40 N. E. (2d) 40 (1942).
The express holding of the majority4 of the court is that it was reversible
error to admit the testi'nony of these non-accomplice witnesses on matters
irrelevant or of common knowledge, and of no probative value to connect the
defendant with the crime. The rationale is that because of such error the
jury might give a general credibility to the narration of Reles regarding the
"vital and controverted particulars of his story against the defendant." Fur-
ther, the majority finds that the credibility evidence was merely of "slight,
remote and conjectural significance," tending to confuse the real issues and
unfairly to surprise the defendant to his prejudice. However, the majority
expressly refuses to decide that an accomplice witness may not in any case be
confirmed by evidence of his probable credibility not amounting to corrobora-
tion.5
The dissent maintains that: (1) the credibility of an accomplice may be
supported by testimony going to the detail of the crime and matters connected
therewith, (2) the non-accomplice testimony did not prejudice the defendant
since it served to "confirm and give credence to the narrative," and (3) Sec-
tion 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 7 "established no conclusive test
3See 287 N. Y. at 184. In the record on appeal, Requests to Charge, p. 789, the
following colloquy takes place:
"Mr. Ryan [counsel for defense]: I say that that evidence [of the non-
accomplice witnesses] cannot tend to connect the defendant with the commission
of the crime.
"The Court: I so charge, but it does tend to show, or prove or disprove the
credibility of a witness. (Italics added.)
" Mr. Ryan: I take exception to that ruling."4The majority opinion is written by Loughran, J., in which Lehman, C.J., Rippey,
and Desmond, JJ., concur.
5287 N. Y. at 193. ". . . without deciding that an accomplice witness may not be
confirmed by evidence of his probable credibility not amounting to corroboration ... "
GThe dissenting opinion is written by Lewis, J., in which Finch and Conway, JJ.,
concur.
7"A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is cor-
roborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission
of the crime." (Italics added.)
The Committee on the Administration of Justice in New York, recommended that
Section 399 be deleted from the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the Legislature did
not act upon its suggestion. The- report of the Committee states at p. 16: "The
Committee was strongly of the opinion that this section in the present Code is a refuge
of organized crime and protects principles [sic] in racketeering cases. The deletion
of this provision will remove the present anomalies in the law arising from statutory
exceptions and court decisions relating to the question as to who is an accomplice. ...
The Committee carefully considered the possibility that the deletion of this provision
might encourage frame-ups and related abuses, but was strongly of the opinion that
such would not be the case. The deletion of this provision merely restores the common
law and permits the trial court to give appropriate instructions in each case affecting
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for the admissibility of corroborative evidence," and was not intended to pro-
hibit evidence offered to support the credibility of an accomplice witness.
At common law, a jury, if satisfied of the truth of the statements made by an
accomplice, could convict on his testimony alone,8 but it was customary for
judges to instruct jurors that they should not convict a defendant upon the
evidence of an accomplice unless such evidence was corroborated.9 In 1882,
Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was adopted in New York,
making the corroboration of an accomplice's evidence mandatory in order to
convict a defendant.
The Nitzberg case squarely presents the question whether, in view of Sec-
tion 399, evidence is admissible which may buttress the credibility of the
accomplice witness but falls short of the requisite for convicting the defendant,
i.e., fails to connect the defendant with the crime. Actually, this question is
not answered in the opinion because of the reservation of the court limiting
the decision to the facts of the qase.
There are two distinct types of corroboration of an accomplice.10 One
involves evidence of facts and circumstances related to the crime which tend to
support the truth of the testimony of the accomplice, and the competency
of this evidence should not depend upon whether it tends to connect the
defendant with the crime."- The other type is essential for conviction of a
defendant and must tend to connect the defendant with the crime.12  In
essence, these two types of corroboration represent respectively the views of
the minority and the majority of the court in the ,Nitzberg case, although
the decision fails to make this clear. Upon at least one occasion, the Court
of Appeals has noted this distinction, and the court upheld the charge of the
trial court judge as sufficient against the objection of counsel that it did not
the credibility of the testimony offered instead of binding the court to the general rule
prescribed by the statute." Legis. Docum. (1937) No. 77, Commission on the Adminis-
tration of Justice in New York.
SPeople v. Costello, 1 Denio 83 (N. Y. 1845) ; In re Hasdenbrook, 135 App. Div. 634,
121 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1st Dep't 1909) ; People v. Dyle, 21 N. Y. 578 (1860) ; Dunn v.
People, 29 N. Y. 523 (1864).
OPeople v. Everhardt, 104 N, Y. 591 (1887).
10 Slayton v. State, 234 Ala. 9, 173 So. 645 (1937); State v. Scott, 203 Minn. 56,
279 N. W. 832 (1938).
lSee cases cited in note 17 infra.
12 See Section 399, Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 5. People v. Feolo, 284
N. Y. 381, 31 N. E. (2d) 496 (1940); People v. O'Farrell, 175 N. Y. 323, 67 N. E.
588 (1903) ; People v. Mayhew, 150 N. Y. 346, 44 N. E. 971 (1896) ; People v. Haynes,
55 Barb. 450 (N. Y. 1869).
The English rule on corroboration sufficient for conviction of the defendant is the
same. Rex v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K. B. 658, 10 B. R. C. 337. The appellant sought
to analogize and draw support from the famous statement in Reg. v. Farler, 8 Car.
& P. 106, 173 Eng. Rep. 418 (1837) that "a man who has been guilty of a crime
would always be able to relate the facts of the case, and if the confirmation be only
on the truth of that history without identifying the persons, that is really no corrobora-
tion at all." This and other cases are analyzed in the Appellant's Brief, p.'52 et seq.
But these cases concern corroboration of an accomplice for the purpose of convicting
the defendant and the consequent necessity of connecting the defendant with the crime.
The cases are therefore no authority for an answer to the problem presented by the
Nitzberg case.
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clearly distinguish between the two types of corroboration.'3
In this appeal, the question is not presented of the sufficiency of corrobora-
tion to connect the defendant with the crime. This type of corroboration,
required by statute, had been given by three other witnesses.14 If the testi-
mony of the non-accomplice witnesses here being considered was offered to
meet the statutory requirement, dearly it would be insufficient and non-com-
pliant with the express terms of the statute.
On the question of corroboration sufficient for conviction, the majority
holding can be brought within prior rulings of this court. Under the mandate
of the statute the corroborative evidence must "tend to connect the defendant
with the crime."'85 In the Nitzberg case "not a single item of testimony...
had any applicability whatsoever to his [the defendant's] identity as a parti-
cipator in this crime."', Evidence for the purpose of conviction is insufficient
if it goes merely to the credibility of the accomplice witness.17 Detailing the
facts and circumstances of the crime will not be sufficient for this purpose,'
8
nor will it suffice to submit evidence tending to show the jury that the accom-
13People v. Cohen, 223 N. Y. 406, 423, 119 N. E. 886, 891 (1918). "Some criticism
is made as to the charge of the trial judge. It is claimed that it puts before the jury
less clearly than it should the distinction between general corroboration . . . and such
corroboration of an accomplice as is required by the Code .... taking the charge as a
whole it fairly presented the case to the jury, leaving to it the determination of all
proper questions of fact."
14The three other witnesses whose testimony tended to connect the defendant with
the crime were Price, Roberts, and Zager. The trial judge, in his charge to the jury,
stated: ". . . the prosecution has produced other witnesses, from which witnesses the
prosecution claims it has obtained the other evidence required by Section 399 to cor-
roborate the accomplices so as to tend to connect the defendant 'vith the commission
of the crime." See, Charge of the Court, p. 775.
The majority of the court, 287 N. Y. at 193, infers that the testimony of these three
may not be dependable, considering their criminal records. But this court previously
has held that the sufficiency of corroborative evidence is a question for the jury. See
cases cited note 21 infra.
1'Corroboration of a confession must show that the crime has been committed. N. Y.
CODE OF CIUM. PRoc. § 395. Corroboration in the case of rape must extend to every
material fact essential to constitute the crime. N. Y. PEN. LAw § 2013.
Not every part of the testimony of an accomplice need be corroborated. People v.
Hooghkerk, 96 N. Y. 149, 67 How. Prac. 256 (1884) ; People v. Cohen, 223 N. Y. 406,
119 N. E. 886 (1918). Corroboration of an accomplice need not show the commission
of the crime. People v. Swersky, 216 N. Y. 471, 111 N. E. 212 (1916) ; People v.
Reddy, infra note 18.
16287 N. Y. at 186.
'
7 People v. Goldstein, 285 N. Y. 376, 34 N. E. (2d) 362 (1941), at 382: "The statute
is not satisfied if the corroborative evidence tends only to establish the credibility of
the accomplice." See also, People v. Kress, 284 N. Y. 452, 31 N. E. (2d) 898 (1940).
2 BisHop's NEW CvimiNAL PROCEDmUE (2d ed. 1913) at 998, states: "The jury may
consider evidence tending to show the probable credibility of the accomplice's narrative,
though coming short of the required confirmation." Many of the cases cited are not
direct authority for the author's statement. Some support may be found in Lee v.
State, 21 Oh. St. 151 (1871) (theft) and People v. Williams, 18 Cal. 187 (1861)
(murder). No New York cases are cited.
'SPeople v. Feolo, 284 N. Y. 381, 31 N. E. (2d) 496 (1940) ; People v. Maione, 284
N. Y. 423, 31 N. E. (2d) 759 (1940) ; People v. Reddy, 261 N. Y. 479, 185 N. E. 705
(1933) ; People v. Barron, 150 Misc. 29, 268 N. Y. Supp. 344 (Co. Ct. 1934).
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plice .is telling the truth unless it also tends to connect the defendant with the
crime.19
However, the court should not apply these rules to evidence tending only to
support the credibility of the accomplice when the corroboration required by
statute has been fulfilled otherwise. The question has not been decided in
New York. In other jurisdictions, having statutes similar to that of New
York,20 what meager authority there is seems to be in accord with the dis-
senting opinion in the Nitzberg case. 2 1  The problem is presented whether
Section 399 is exclusive and permits no other type of corroborative evidence.
The appellant admits that the enactment of Section 399 did not change the
rules of confirming an accomplice but merely codified the common law practice
in New York.22  It is the opinion of the minority of the court that evidence
which was 'admissible prior to the enactment of Section 399 should still be
received, although it is not sufficient for conviction. Whether the evidence
tending to connect the defendant with the crime is sufficient corroboration is a
question for the jury.2 3 Correspondingly, the degree of credit which ought
to be given to the testimony of an accomplice is a matter exclusively within
the province of the jury.2 4 It should follow that the jury is the best judge
of whether it will believe the testimony of the accomplice, and toward that end
evidence of credibility should be received. The majority of the judges in the
Nitzberg case, at least by implication, take a contrary view and state that the
court will decide whether the jury should be allowed to consider independent
testimony bearing on the credibility of the accomplice.
The argument of the majority seems untenable that the evidence of the non-
accomplice witnesses was a surprise and prejudicial to the defendant, and
tended to confuse the real issues of the case. Under Section 542, Code of
1'People v. Dixon, 231 N. Y. 111, 131 N. E. 752 (1921); People v. Silverman, 252
App. Di . 149, 297 N. Y. Supp. 449 (2d Dep't 1937); People v. Bloodgood, 251 App.
Div. 593, 298 N. Y. Supp. 91 (3d Dep't 1937) ; People v. Buono, 229 App. Div. 731, 241
N. Y. Supp. 625 (2d Dep't 1930). For the purpose of conviction it is insufficient to
give evidence merely tending to show that the accomplice told the truth in several
particulars. People v. Haynes, 55 Barb. 450, 38 How. Prac. 369 (N. Y. 1869).2O0 For a summary of the state statutes, see VII WIGmoRE, EviDENcE (3d ed. 1940)
§ 2056, n. 10.2 1 State v. Maney, 54 Conn. 178, 6 Atl. 401 (1886); State v. Watson, 31 Mo. 361
(1861); Ettinger v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 338 (1881) ; Braton v. State, 21 Tex. 337
(1858); State v. Hayes, 109 W. Va. 296, 153 S. E. 496 (1930). Semble, Beeson v.
State, 60 Tex. Crim. Rep. 39, 130 S. W. 1006 (1910)'; Wisdom v. State, 45 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 215, 75 S. W. 22 (1903). 2 WHARTON'S CRIMNr.L EVDENCE (11th ed. 1935)
§ 730: "Where an accomplice has been corroborated as to important facts tending to
connect the accused with the crime, and his credibility is attacked, evidence is permissible
to corroborate his evidence as to minor details not connecting the accused with the
crime, his credibility being a matter for jury determination." See Respondent's Brief,
p. 46 et seq.2 2Appellant's Brief, p. 51: "The only change effected by the enactment of Section 399,
Code of Criminal Procedure, was to nake mandatory an acquittal where the accomplice
was uncorroborated, but the legal principles applicable to accomplice testimony other-
Wise remained unchanged (People v. Blank, 283 N. Y. 526, 528; People v. Mayhew,
150 N. Y. 346)."23People v. Crum, 272 N. Y. 348, 6 N. E. (2d) 51 (1936) ; People v. O'Farrell, 175
N. Y. 323, 67 N. E. 588 (1903) ; People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591, 11 N. E. 62 (1887).2 4 GRENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) 519.
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Criminal Procedure,2 5 in determining whether error is prejudicial, the court
will assume that the jury is composed of reasonable men.26  It is the province
of the trial judge to apprise the jurors of the real issues of the case and to
dispel any confusion thereon. The prevailing opinion fails to give due credit
to the lucid and careful instructions of the trial judge, since the record shows
that his charge painstakingly explained the limited purpose for which the
disputed evidence could be considered.2 7  It is common knowledge that the
testimony of any accomplice is to be regarded with suspicion.2 8  The most
natural thing for the prosecution to do would be to attempt to bolster the
credibility of an accomplice witness. Surely this was not unanticipated by
the defense. There was full opportunity for the defense to cross-examinq
and impeach these witnesses,2 9 yet each and every matter sworn to by the
non-accomplice witnesses was uncontroverted by the defendant. If there was
any surprise in this case it would be the evidence tending to connect the defen-
dant with the crime, given by the three other non-accomplice witnesses. These
three did not testify before the grand jury and are referred to in the brief of
the appellant as the "Last Minute Men".30 Yet this court does not mention
any surprise or prejudice resulting from the testimony of these witnesses
which was far more damaging and important to the prosecution than that of
the non-accomplice witnesses here considered. Concededly, whether the ad-
mission of certain evidence, alleged to be prejudicial, is reversible error is a
matter of opinion upon which the judges frequently disagree.31
The majority states that the record does not clearly disclose the guilt of the
accused,32 and the testimony of the non-accomplice witnesses was adduced in
25
"After hearing the appeal, the court must give judgment, without regard to technical
errors or defects or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."20People v. Wagner, 245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).27See Charge of the Court, by Judge Brancato, p. 765 et seq. Section 399 was read
twice to the jury, carefully explained in great detail, and it was pointed out several
times that the evidence of the accomplice witnesses was not sufficient to convict the
defendant unless the jury was satisfied that there was other "believable evidence which
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged." See, espe-
cially, p. 766.28People v. Kress, 284 N. Y. 452, 31 N. E. (2d) 898 (1940). The testimony is
admitted solely from the necessity of the case to prevent a failure of justice, and is
resorted to only in default of evidence emanating from a better source. An accomplice
may be expected to color or magnify the defendant's connection with the crime for the
purpose of concealing his own infamy. He testifies under a strong motive to deceive
and the desirability and necessity of corroboration is obvious and undisputed.
29Even if the court refuses to permit the defense to discredit an accomplice witness
by asking about prior convictions it may not be error. People v. Weiss, 129 App. Div.
671, 114 N. Y. Supp. 236 (2d Dep't 1908).
SOAppellant's Brief, p. 27 et seq.
31People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058 (1915), cited by the majority,
deciding that it was prejudicial error not to instruct the jury as to lesser degrees of
murder upon which they might convict, was a 4-2 decision, one Judge not voting. People
v. IKoerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926), following the Marendi case, was split
4-3 on a similar question.32The fact that there is rational doubt of the guilt of the defendant is not sufficient
ground for reversal under § 542. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275 (1893)
People v. Burton, 28 N. Y. Supp. 1081 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
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the apprehension that without it the verdict probably would be not guilty.
Disparaging the prosecution's chance of success, without the use of this non-
accomplice evidence, appears neither justified nor necessary from the facts.
It is difficult to appraise a decision, such as this, where the defendant and
many of the witnesses for the prosecution are criminals of long standing,
some of them vicious. 33 That the testimony of any one of them must be re-
ceived with caution is patent,3 4 and testimony should be welcomed which
tends to strengthen the narrative of an accomplice witness. The Nitzberg case
should not be used to establish a new interpretation of Section 399, bitt should
be limited to its facts. In the majority of cases the jury should be entitled,
with proper instructions from the trial judge, to consider evidence which
supports the credibility of an accomplice but does not connect the defendant
with the crime, providing the statutory requirement for conviction has been
fulfilled by the testimony of other witnesses.3 5
Tozier Brozun
Dower: Fraud of: Dower in land held by a "one man" corporation: The
de facto doctrine: Disregard of the corporate personality to secure
dower.- In Telis v. Telis et al., - N. J. Eq. -, 26 A. (2d) 249 (1942)
the individual defendant, a married man, attempted to incorporate an exist-
ing business and thereafter operated the business apparently as a corpora-
tion. Although a certificate of incorporation was filed with the county clerk,
a certificate was never filed with the Secretary of State. The defendant
husband retained possession of all the 100 shares of stock notwithstanding
that two were in the name of others. No formal meeting of the corporation
was ever held, no by-laws were ever adopted, and the husband mingled the
corporate funds with his own. The corporation entered into an agreement
to purchase some real property. The husband paid $1,331.41 of the purchase
price of $4,400, but whether from his own or corporate funds does not
appear. The balance was secured by a purchase money mortgage executed
by the corporation, and title to the property was taken in its name. This
suit was brought by the wife against her husband and the corporation to
secure her inchoate right of dower in the property referred to, claiming that
"her husband, or another to his use" was seised of an "estate of inheritance"
therein.' It was held that there was an inchoate right of dower. In reaching
33Appellant's Brief reveals the following: (p. 5) Reles was a self-confessed eleven-
time murderer; (p. 18) Magoon had stolen about fifty cars which were used in murders;
(p. 21) Tannenbaum confessed to participation in six murders; (p. 28) Zager was a
professional racketeer; (p. 30) Roberts was a convicted thief; (p. 35) Price was
three times in prison; (p. 48) Nitzberg was a counterfeiter.34See note 21 supra.35For a contrary conclusion and analysis, see Wormser, Corroboration of Accomplices
in Criminal Cases (1942) 11 FopDHAm L. REV. 193. The author of this article, I. Maurice
Wormser, Professor of Law at Fordham University, argued the case for the appellant
and was of counsel on the Appellant's Brief in the Nitzberg case.
1The complete New Jersey statute is as follows: "The widow, whether alien or not,
of a person dying intestate or otherwise, shall be endowed, for the term of her natural
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this result the court expressly excluded the possibility of fraud of dower by
pointing out that while fraud was alleged it was not proved, and by impli-
cation, it excluded the possibility of a resulting trust to the husband. 2 The
decision was predicated on the ground that this was a proper case to dis-
regard the corporate personality of this de facto corporation, the court
assuming, without expressly finding, that this was a de facto corporation.
By holding that there was neither a resulting trust nor fraud of dower
the court took, in regard to both, a position in accord with the weight of
authority. A resulting trust arises from the inferred intentions of the par-
ties.3 It has been held that where land is conveyed to a corporation, organ-
ized to hold land, the presumed intention of a resulting trust is rebutted.4
Another ground for rejecting the resulting trust, when title is taken in a cor-
poration, is that the person having enjoyed the corporate privileges and
immunities, and having suffered the corresponding disabilities, a resulting
trust, under such circumstances, would be a fraud on the incorporation stat-
ute.5 In some states a resulting trust is not allowed by statute in this situ-
ation.' Even if there were a resulting trust the individual defendant would
life, of one full and equal half part of all real estate whereof her husband, or another
to his use, was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time during coverture, to which
she shall not have relinquished or released her right of dower by deed duly executed and
acknowledged in the manner provided by law for deeds to be recorded." N. J. STAT.
ANN. (1939) § 3:37-1.
2This was excluded by reference to Brown v. Brown, 82 N. J. Eq. 40, 88 AUt. 186
(1913) which dealt with a resulting trust.3RE.STATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 440 states the general rule: "Where a transfer of
property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting
trust arises in favor of the person by whom the purchase price is paid, except as stated
in §§ 441, 442, 444."
§ 441 provides: "A resulting trust does not arise where a transfer of property is
made by one person and the purchase price is paid by another, if the person by whom
the purchase price is paid manifests an intention that no resulting trust should arise."4Miemasech v. Bernett- Holding Co., 125 N. J. Eq. 284, 4 A. (2d) 794 (1939);
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Vander Roest, 113 N. J. Eq. 473, 166 Atl. 918 (1933).
Where title is taken by a personal holding company the inference is that the pur-
chaser intends the company to have absolute legal title. A gift rather than a trust is
presumed. But compare the result when title is taken in the name of a natural person.
Redman's Adm'x v. Redman, 112 Ky. 716, 66 S. W. 745 (1902).5 Fidelity Union Trust Company v. Vander Roest, 113 N. J. Eq. 473, 166 Atl. 918
(1933) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 952, 75 At. 568 (1910).
The courts seem to fear that the sole stockholder, who paid the purchase price for the
property, will attempt to use the resulting trust to his own advantage and to the detri-
ment of the corporation.
ON. Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 94 is an example of this: "A grant of real property for a
valuable consideration, to one person, the consideration being paid by another, is pre-
sumed fraudulent as against the creditors, at the time, of the person paying the con-
sideration, and, unless a.fraudulent intent is disproved, a trust results in favor of such
creditors, to an extent necessary to satisfy their just demands, but the title vests in
the grantee, and no use or trust results from the payment to the person paying the
consideration or in his favor, unless the grantee either,
1. Takes the same as an absolute conveyance, in his own name, without the consent
or knowledge of the person paying the consideration; or,
2. In violation of some trust, purchases the property so conveyed with money or
property, belonging to another." Gabler v. Gabler et aL., 118 Misc. 534, 193 N. Y. Supp.
500 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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have only an equitable estate in the land as a resulting trust is not executed
by the statute of uses,7 and this equitable estate is not subject to dower in
some states by the interpretation given their dower statutes." Although
neither of these statutory bars was present in the New Jersey case, the court
reached a,'correct decision on this point.
As to fraud of dower, proof that the husband paid for land which he
caused to be conveyed to a corporation does Inot, without more, establish
fraud under any of the three views prevailing in this country. Under the
-strict view the possibility of fraud does not exist as the husband is deemed
to be free to do what he wants with his personal property without having
dower attach to the land bought therewith in the name of another. 9 In
" Kentucky, fraud of dower is presumed if the husband strips himself of the
greater portion of his assets, either real or personal, but no proof of such
conduct on the part of the husband was offered in the present case.10 Under
the majority view, an intent to deprive the wife of her dower rights must
be shown by the words or conduct of the husband." The facts in this case
do not show such an intent.1 2 It is submitted that under any view the court
was correct in holding that there was no fraud of dower.
In assuming that this was a de facto corporation, the court, unfortunately,
failed to indicate which of the two theories of the de facto doctrine it
adopted. 13 Both theories are similar in that there are three requirements
for the application of the de facto doctrine:14 (1) 'a statute under which
incorporation is possible, (2) a bona fide attempt to incorporate, and (3)
71 SCOTT, TRuSTS (1939) § 73; RESTATB aENT, TRusTs (1935) § 73; Ohio & Colo-
rado Smelting & Refining Co. v. Barr, 58 Colo. 116, 144 Pac. 552 (1914) ; Pachard v.
Marshall, 138 Mass. 301 (1885); Moore v. Spellman, 5 Denio 225 (N. Y. 1848).
SThe Oregon statute as interpreted in In re Grattons Estate, 133 Ore. 65, 283 Pac.
747 (1930), is an example of this. It provides: "The widow of every deceased person
shall be entitled to dower, or the use during her natural life, or one-half part of all the
land whereof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time during
the marriage, unless she is lawfully barred thereof." ORE. Co rP. LAWS ANN. (1940)
§ 2:17-101.
Since dower did not exist in equitable estates at common law it does not exist today
in Oregon as the statute does not expressly allow it.
9 McClean v. Denwood Realty Co., 124 Misc. 283, 207 N. Y. Supp. 226 (Sup. Ct.
1924). Since a married woman has no dower in the personal property of her husband
she cannot complain if he buys real property in another's name. This view is changed
in New York today by the use of the statutory substitute for dower. N. Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 83.
10 Rowe v. Ratcliff, 268 Ky. 217, 104 S. W. (24) 437 (1937).
"lKnights v. Knights, 300 Ill. 618, 133 N. E. 377 (1921).
12 Knights v. Knights, ibid.; Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 179, 39 N. E. 864 (1894);
Nash v. Kirschoff, 116 Minn. 464, 208 N. W. 193 (1926); Asam v. Asam, 239 Pa.
297, 86 Ati. 871 (1913).
13 It is not within the scope of this note to discuss the basis of the assumption that
there was a de facto corporation. The cases are in conflict and cannot be harmonized.
For an excellent discussion of the conflict in the applicable theories compare STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS (1936) §§ 27-30 and Edward H. Warren, Collateral Attack on liworpo-
ration (1907) 20 HAgv. L. REv. 456 with Charles E. Carpenter, De Facto Corporations
(1912) 25 HARV. L. REv. 623 and 8 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, (Perm ed.
1932) § 3765.
1 4 STEVENS. CORPORATIONS (1936) § 28 and 8 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS
(Perm. ed. 1932) § 3777.
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a user of the corporate form. The theories are dissimilar, however, as to
whether an additional element is necessary. 15 Under the first theory any
organization fulfilling the above three requirements is a de facto corpora-
tion.' 6 There is no hesitancy on the part of a court to find such a corporation.
Under the second theory the finding of a de facto corporation is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Not only are the three requirements necessary but
there must exist also "extenuating circumstances" to justify the court in
applying this doctrine.17 Such a corporation would be found only when its
existence would promote justice.' 8
The propriety of attempting to disregard the corporate personality depends
upon which of the above theories was adopted by the court. By disregarding
the corporate personality the court decided that circumstances did not war-
rant the continued attribution of corporateness to the organization.' 9 Under
the second theory the court, if it held that there was a de facto corporation,
admitted that the circumstances warranted the finding of corporateness.
Since a de facto corporation was found aid the corporate personality was
disregarded only with respect to the precise situation before the court,
20 it
would seep that the extenuating circumstances necessary for the de facto
corporation are just the opposite of the reasons justifying the disregard of
the corporate personality.21 If the court followed the second theory, the
finding of a de facto corporation would absolutely prevent the disregard of
the corporate personality in the same case. If the court, however, adopted
the first theory of the de facto doctrine, they could have disregarded the
corporate personality. The court, provided the three requirements were met,
had to find a de facto corporation; the presence of "extenuating circum-
stances" was not necessary. Although it was not indicated which theory of
the de facto doctrine the court accepted, it will be assumed that the first
theory was adopted and, if this were the proper case, it would be permissible
for them to disregard the corporate personality.
In order to determine whether this was a proper case to disregard the
corporate personality, it is necessary to establish the principles on which
such disregard may be based. Apparently no court has ever been faced
with the question of disregarding the corporate personality in order to enable
'
5STvENs, op. cit. supra note 13 and Warren, loc. cit. supra note 13, believe that an
additional element is necessary.
16Charles E. Carpenter, De Facto Corporations (1912) 25 HAav. L. REv. 623, 624-625.17Edward H. Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation (1907) 20 HARv. L. Rv.
456, 469.
'sThe courts, by this theory, have to determine whether circumstances warrant the
attribution of the corporate personality to the organization. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS
(1936) § 20.
'
9Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th
1928) ; Whitfield v. Kern, 122 N. J. Eq. 332, 192 Atl. 48 (1937) ; Bendam Holding
Corp. v. Rodner, 242 App. Div. 233, 273 N. Y. Supp. 481 (2d Dep't 1934) ; Farmer's
Loan and Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532 (Sup. Ct. 1927).2 0 1t is still possible to find a de facto corporation as to X and to disregard the corpo-
rate personality as to Y. In the instant case only one party, the wife, is involved.
21Justice must lie on one side or the other. If it lies on the side of the corporation
there can be no disregard of the corporate personality; if it lies on the other there
can be no corporation.
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the wife to secure her right of dower.22 Although the cases in which there is
a disregard of the corporate personality may be grouped,23 it is impossible
to lay down any definite rule as to when the courts will do so.2 As a general
doctrine, when the corporate concept is urged to an extent not within its
reason and purpose, it should be disregarded and the corporation considered
as an aggregation of 'persons. 25 It has been said that a court will disregard
the concept of a corporation when it is "used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime."'26 It must be remembered
that a "one man" corporation has the attributes of any corporation. 2  The
crektion of a "one man" ,corporation for the purpose of avoiding personal
liability, 28 or for the purpose of securing simplicity in the administration of
his estate29 does not coristitute fraud justifying the disregard of the corpo-
rate personality for the benefit of the wife. Because, however, dower is for
obvious reasons a favorite of the law,30 the formation of a corporation for
the purpose of defrauding a wife of her dower would justify a disregard
of the corporate personality.31 It is enough, however, to find the exist-
ence of fraud in the formation of the corporation. It must be shown further
that the disregard of the corporate personality would not permit an injustice
to some third person or would not contravene public policy.32 Especially
22 0ne of the reasons for the adoption of the modern statutory substitute for dower
(N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 83) was the increasing number of personal holding com-
panies and the inability of the wife to secure dower in the lands held by these corpo-
rations. REPORTS OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE Co.missIoN (Reprint ed. 1930) 16; and
Barry, Modernizing the Law of Decedent Estates (1929) 16 VA. L. RLv. 107, 120.23 WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED PROBLEMS (1927)
42-85 lists four classes of cases in which the corporate personality is generally dis-
regarded.
(1) Courts of law do not tolerate any attempt to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
'In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio 1907).
(2) The corporate personality will be disregarded when one corporation is a mere
instrumentality or agent of another corporation. In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546
(C. C. A. Zd 1905). See also, Note (1935) 102 A. L. R. 1054.
(3) A corporation cannot be formed to allow it to evade a statute or to modify
the statutory intent. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 U. S. 257, 31 Sup.
Ct. 387 (1911).
(4) The corporation will be disregarded if it is an instrument of monopoly. People
v. Northern Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834 (1890).24 STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) § 19.
25 Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation (1907) 20 HARv. L. REv. 456.2 6 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 14Z Fed. 247, 255 (C. C. E. D.
Wis., 1905) ; WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE
PROBLEMS (1927) 1-85.2 7Baldwin v. Carefield, 26 Minn. 43 (1879) ; Palmer v. Ring, 113 App. Div. 643, 99
N. Y. Supp. 290 (2d Dep't 1906) and cases cited therein. Contra: First National Bank
!f Gadsden v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168 (1898) ; Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co., 65 Md.
428. 5 Atl. 534 (1886).
2SGledhill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 262 N. W. 371 (1935).2 9In re Langdon's Estate, 139 Misc. 379, 248 N. Y. Supp. 146 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; In re
Gerbereux' Will, 146 Misc. 461, 266 N. Y. Supp. 139 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
SOThayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107, 39 Am. Dec. 211 (1842).
3This reasoning is based on the fraud of dower cases. For a general discussion
see 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 506, 507.3 2 Nighbert v. First National Bank, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 624, 79 P. (2d) 1105 (1938);
Berkey v. Third Ave. Railroad Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926); Laurent v.
Cincinnati Clearing House Ass'n, 55 Ohio App. 469, 9 N.'E. (2d) 886 (1937).
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is this true of the rights of. creditors who have relied on the corporation's
assets.
33
The instant case, however, under these criteria, seems to be incorrectly
decided. Incorporation was attempted to carry on an existing business. It
was expressly stated that there was no proof of fraud on the wife and the
court excluded the possibility of recovery on this ground. How can it now
disregard the corporate personality on the basis of fraud? Furthermore, the
court did not consider or even mention the effect of its decision on the rights
of third parties.
E. T. Brown, Jr.
Federal Practice: Third-party practice in the district courts: Impleader
of a joint tort feasor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a):
Erie v. Tompkins.-In Thompson v. Cranston, 6 Fed. Rules Sent. 14a.511,
Case 1, 2 F. R. D. 270 (W. D. N. Y. 1942), the defendant applied to bring
in a third party in a personal injury action, alleging that the third party was
also liable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff and the third party were both citizens
of New York. In dismissing the motion to join the third party, Judge Knight
set forth two main reasons. First, without amending his complaint, the plain-
tiff could nbt recover against the third-party defendant, and since the plaintiff
and the third-party defendant were citizens of the same state, the plaintiff
could not amend without destroying the jurisdiction of the court.' Second,
Rule 14(a) is merely procedural, and'it cannot change the substantive law
of the State of New York, which is applicable, namely, that there is no right
to contribution among joint tort feasors unless there has been a joint judg-
ment obtained against them.2 The result of the holding is that where the
Federal Rules would, in effect, change the substantive law of the state in which
the district court is sitting, Erie v. TompkinS3 controls to the extent that the
federal procedure cannot be literally followed.
331; re Langdon's Estate, 139 Misc. 379, 248 N. Y. Supp. 146 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
'Accord: Herrington v. Jones, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 2, 2. F. R. D. 108
(E. D. La. 1941) ; Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case-3(E. D. N. Y. 1941); Johnson v. Sherrard Co., 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 1(D. Mass. 1941).
But see Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948, 950 (D. Md. 1941). See also,
Osthaus v. Button, 70 F. (2d) 392 (C. C A. 3d 1934), refusing an indirect joinder of a
third party who could not have been joined originally.2N. Y. Civ. Pmac. AcT §§ 193(2), 211(a). Joinder is allowed in New York only
where the third party is shown to be liable over to the defendant in whole or in part
for the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. Only where a plaintiff elects to sue two
or more joint tort feasors can the one obtain contribution from the other. The two
sections must be construed together. Fox v. Western Motor Lines, 257 N. Y. 305, 178
N. E. 289 (1931). See also, Birchall v. Clemens Realty Co., 241 App. Div. 286, 271
N. Y. Supp. 547 (lst Dep't 1934) ; Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258 1912) ;
Kapossky v. Berry, 212 App. Div. 833, 207 N. Y. Supp. 719 (2d Ddp't 1925). See N. Y.
Consolidated R. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 193 App. Div. 438, 184 N. Y. Supp. 234 (2d
Dep't 1920), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 547, 135 N. E. 912 (1922).
3304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938). A similar problem is presented under Rule
23(b). See Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 3d 1941). Compare Venner
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Rule 14(a) provides for a more liberal joinder than is allowed in the state
codes, giving a defendant the opportunity to join a third party "who is or
may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him."4 (italics added). The purpose of the rule is to enable contro-
versies arising between more than two parties to be settled in one action, and
thus avoid unnecessary multiplicity of suits, and also to simplify and make
uniform the third party practice in the federal courts. 5
The third-party action generally has been considered ancillary to the main
suit, and no independent grounds for jurisdiction are necessary.6 Where the
third-party defendant is a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff in the
original action, an objection on this ground has been uniformly overruled. 7
When the third-party defendant objects to the suit being improperly brought
in the district, for the reason that neither the third-party plaintiff nor the
third-party defendant are residents of that district, the courts have split.
There are some cases granting the motion to dismiss the third-party complaint
on the venue objection,8 but the more recent cases have applied what appears
to be the better rule, and the objection to venue is overcome on the basis of
the ancillary character of the third-party proceeding. 9
Where the defendant seeks to join a third party who is liable to indemnify
him for any liability he may have to the plaintiff,' 0 or who is liable secondarily
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24, 28 Sup. Ct. 328 (1908) with Pollitz v. Gould,
202 N. Y. 11, 94 N. E. 1088 (1911). See, Mooz es FEDERAL PRACTICE (1933) 2252;
Note (1930) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472, 1483.4Rule 14(a) provides in part: "Before the service of his answer a defendant may
move ex parte, or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave
as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is granted and the summons and complaint
are served, the person so served ... shall make his defenses as provided in Rule 12
and his counterclaims and cross-claims against the plaintiff, the third-party plaintiff, or
any other party as provided in Rule 13.... The third-party plaintiff is bound by the
adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff .... The plaintiff may
amend his pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any claim which the
plaintiff might have against the third-party defendant had he been joined originally as a
defendant. . . ." (1934) 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. following 7 23(c) (1938).
See, Crim v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715, 713 (D. C. 1939).
Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 193(2) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon's, 1939) § 2258 (c).
5See, Crim v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715 (D. C. 1939);
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) c. 14, p. 740.6Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941) ; Illinois v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 2 F. R. D. 241 (N. D. Ill. 1941) ; Calvino v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship
Corp., 29 F. Supp. 1022 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Barkeij v. Don Lee, Inc., 3 Fed. Rules
Serv. 14a.222, Case 2 (S. D. Cal. 1940);-Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (W. D.
Pa. 1939); Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F. Supp. 67 (D. N. J. 1939); Kravas v.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939) ; Schram v. Roney,
30 F. Supp. 458 (E. D., Mich. 1939).
"See cases cited mzpra note 6.8Skirt Co., Inc. v. Wimpfheimer, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 239 (D. Mass. 1939); King v.
Shepherd, 26 F. Supp. 357 (W. D. Ark. 1938).9Gray v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. La. 1940);
Morrell v. United Air Lines, 29 F. Supp. 757 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Lewis v. United Air
Lines, 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1939). Note (1939) 24 MINN. L. REv. 126.
30 Burris v. American Chicle Co., 29 F. Supp. 773 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Ibid., 120 F.
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to the defendant," or who is liable contractually, to him, 1 2 the joinder is
allowed in the discretion of the court.' 3 In these situations, there is little
possibility of an indirect change in the substantive law applicable. However,
if the defendant in a personal injury action attempts to join a third party in
the district court when he could not have done so in the state court, the
question arises whether, if the joinder were allowed under Rule 14 "(a), it
would be contrary to the holding of Erie v. Tonlpkins that the district courts
must apply the substantive law of the state in which they are sitting. In other
words, can federal procedural rules alter, even indirectly, the substantive law
of the state in which the district court is sitting?
The early cases in which Rule 14(a) was used allowed the impleading,
without discussing the applicability of Erie v. Tompkins, or the possible alter-
ation of the substantive law of the state.' 4 The general test followed was that
if the third party could have been originally joined by the plaintiff, and there
was an existing liability if the plaintiff chose to assert his claim, the third
party could be brought in by the defendant.' 5 The validity of this test in a
tort action seems questionable. If the third party defendant is a citizen of the
same state as the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had originally brought suit against
the third party, except where there is a separable controversy, the requisite
diversity of citizenship would not exist to give the federal court jurisdiction.' 6
It is admitted, however, that where the defendant merely seeks indemnity or
contribution on a joint obligation, the test would be valid. The application of
this test would seem to be limited to an action where the defendant has a
right over against the third party, in spite of the wording of Rule 14(a) to
the contrary.17
(2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d 1941) ; Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F. R. D. 238 (D. Minn., 1942);
Watkins v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 29 F. Supp. 700 (W. D. Pa. 1939); Culmer v. B. & 0.
Ry. Co., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.266, Case 2 (W. D. Pa. 1941).
"1Metzger v. Breeze Corp., 37 F. Supp. 693 (D. N. J. 1941) ; Saunders v. Goldstein,
30 F. Supp. 150 (D. C. 1939); Balcoff v. Teagarden, 36 F. Supp. 224 (S. D. N. Y.
1940). See Kravas v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
12Williams v. Keyes, 125 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 5th 1942).
13 Whether to allow the impleading has been considered to be in the discretion of the
district judge. General Taxicab Ass'n, Inc. v. O'Shea, 109 F. (2d) 671 (App. D. C.
1940) ; United States v. Jollimore, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.15, Case 2 (D. Mass. 1941).
Contra: Falcone v. City of New York, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.15, Case 1 (E. D. N. Y.
1941).14Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (S. D. W. Va. 1939);
Crim v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715 (D. C. 1939) ; Sussan v.
Strasser, 36 F. Supp. 266 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Leusch v. Boushell Carrier Co., 3 Fed. Rules
Serv. 14a. 224, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F. Supp. 67
(D. N. J. 1939).
'
5 Crim v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715, 719 (D. C. 1939), ap-
proved in Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F. Supp. 67 (D. N. J. 1939).
I6 The rule is well settled that there must be complete diversity between the parties
in the federal courts for the jurisdiction to attach. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267
(U. S. 1806) ; City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank 314 U. S. 63, 62 Sup. Ct. 15
(1941).1 7Rule 14(a) provides for the bringing in of a third party "who is or may be liable
to him or to the plaintiff." The plaintiff has always been entitled to choose his de-
fendants in a tort action. See cases cited suipra note 2.
See General Taxicab Ass'n Inc. v. O'Shea, 109 F. (2d) 671 (App. D. C. 1940), where
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It is generally expressed that the plaintiff can obtain relief against the third
party only by amending his complaint against him.18 In New York, where
a tort feasor's right to contribution is dependent upon a joint judgment,"0 if
the plaintiff refuses to amend his complaint, the defendant, it seems, could
not recover from the third party even if the joinder were allowed. It has
been held that where the plaintiff stipulates that he will not amend against
the third party,20 or where the third-party defendant is from the same state
as the plaintiff and the defendant has no claim against the third party, but is
merely offering a different person who is liable to the plaintiff, 21 the im-
pleader will not be allowed. If the impleading is merely an attempt to delay
the trial, or would delay the trial, the third-party complaint will be dismissed. 22
the plaintiff did not amend against the third party, and the defendant himself asserted
no claim, the motion to implead the third party was dismissed. See also, Brady v. Black
Diamond S. S. Co., 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.11, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Delano v.
Ives, 40 F. Supp. 672 (E. D. Pa. 1941). Cf. Sussan v. Strasser, 36 F. Supp. 266 (E. D.
Pa. 1941).
But see Keeffe and Cotter, Service of Process in Suits against Directors (1941) 27
CORNELL L. Q. 74, 83, where it is argued that even though an indirect change in the
substantive law would result, Erie v. Tompkins has no application. This school of
thought believes that because of the strong desire of the Supreme Court for procedural
reform, and because of the social desirability of contribution among joint tort feasors,
if the Supreme Court is ever given a chance to pass upon the question, it would hold
that the Federal Rules must be used as they are written, and Erie v. Tompkins will not
be applied. It is submitted that while contribution among joint tort feasors is strongly
to be desired, as long as a state's substantive law does not permit it, it would be carving
a large hole in the doctrine of the Tompkins case to say in effect that when the sub-
stantive law of a state and the procedural rules of the federal courts conflict, the latter
are to control. In the last analysis, those who object to the result reached in the prin-
cipal case do so not on the basis of disagreement with the application of the Tompkins
case, but rather on the basis "that the substantive law of the state of New York is wrong.
See also, Recommendation of Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. (1937) No. 65 (G)
Leg. Doc. (1939) No. 65 (A).
'
8 Crim v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. C. 1939) ; Malkin
v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Md. 1941) ; Sklar v. Hayes, 1 F. R. D. 594
(E. D. Pa. 1941) ; Whitmire v. Partin, 2 F. R. D. 83 (E. D. Tenn. 1941). Cf. United
States v. Nat. City Bank of New York, 32 F. Supp. 890, 893 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Crum
v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (S. D. W. Va. 1939), where the
counsel agreed that if the impleader were allowed, any judgment would be against both
the defendant and the third party.
Rule 14(a) provides in part: "The third-party defendant is bound by the adjudication
of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff." Quaere, does this mean only that,
in a proper case, where the third party has been impleaded, he cannot later attack the
validity of the adjudication of the original defendant's liability?
1 9 See supra note 2.2 ODelano v. Ives, 40 F. Supp. 672 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Whitmire v. Partin, 2 F. R. D.
83 (E. D. Tenn. 1941).2 1When the plaintiff attempts to amend his complaint against a third party whois a
resident of the same state, the ancillary character of the third party proceeding is de-
stroyed. Herrington v. Jones, 2 F. R. D. 108 (E. D. La. 1941); Hoskie v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 3 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Johnson v. Sherrard
Co., 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.511, Case 1 (D. Mass. 1941). See also, Osthaus v. Button,
70 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. A. 3d 1934). Contra: Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948
(D. Md. 1941).22 Connelly v. Bender, 36 F. Supp. 368 (E. D. Mich. 1941) ; United States v. Shuman,
3 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.132, Case 1 (N. D. W. Va. 1940).
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In Gray v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,23 the problem was iden-
tical with that in the Thompson case. The Louisiana law was shown to
entitle the defendant to contribution from another tort feasor, and the im-
pleader was allowed. The court was careful to distinguish the case from one
arising in a state which did not give a right to contribution between j'oint tort
feasors. Malkin v. Arundel Corp.,24 arising in Maryland which has a statute
similar to New York's Civil Practice Act, Section 211-a,25 held that the
impleader could not be allowed. The court said that there could be no judg-
ment over by the defendant against the third party, and that there would
be no judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the third-party defendant
unless the plaintiff amended his pleading to assert the claim.20
Inasmuch as the Federal Rules do not alter, modify, nor enlarge the sub-
stantive rights of the parties,27 and Erie v. Tompkins forces the district courts
to apply the substantive law of the state in which they are sitting, it seems
that the result reached by judge Knight is proper. It has been said that the
purpose of Erie v. Tompkins is to do away with the existence of a dual
system of justice within the boundaries of a state.28 It is submitted that the
proper test to apply in any case where the impleading of a third party is con-
cerned is that where a defendant has a substantive right against another not
a party to the action, he may enforce it by the procedure provided for in
Rule 14(a) .29 But where the defendant has no such substantive right under
the state law, he should not be allowed to delay the plaintiff's action, nor to
join one whom he would not be able to join had the action been in the state
forum.30
Reginald S. Oliver
Joint Venture: Corporations: Misrepresentation: Restitution against
shareholders of seller corporation.- When African Metals Corporation
purchased nickel cathodes and received junk it began an action for restitution
of the purchase price based on fraud and misrepresentation against the seller,
Meade Steel and Metals, Ltd. (hereinafter called Meade Steel) and its sole
owners, officers, and directors, Meade, Teeter, and Bullowa. The four-three
2331 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. La. 1940); id., 32 F. Supp. 335 (W. D. La. 1940); id.,
36 F. Supp. 780 (W. D. La. 1941). 32 F. Supp. 335 at 337: "The legal relation is
established in its substance at the moment of the accident; parties thereafter, by technical
pleading, may not alter the substantive law." The court recognized that the substantive
law of Louisiana and the procedural law of the federal courts "dovetailed perfectly."
2436 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941).
25MD. CoDE (Flack, 1939) Art. 50, § 13.
2636 F. Supp. at 951.
27Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. 723(b) (1934).28Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 34 ILL. L. Rav. 271.29Kravas v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939) ; Gray
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. La. 1940).
3 0Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (S. D. W. Va. 1939).
The court said at page 139: ". . . the question arising under Rule 14 is a decidedly




decision in African Metals Carp. v. Bidlowa et al., 288 N. Y. 78, 41 N. E.
(2d) 466 (1942) presents a novel point of law and an important business
problem.
Meade Steel was without funds1 or credit to handle the opportunity to buy
and sell this lot of Canadian nickel cathodes, so Bullowa agreed with Meade
and Teeter to make a credit of $25,000 available for that purpose. This fund
did not pass to the corporate treasury but remained i'n Bullowa's name. As
general manager of Meade Steel, Meade went to Canada and negotiated a
purchase of said cathodes from one Brenner. Teeter, a member of the broker-
age firm holding the Bullowa account, paid Meade's expenses out of the credit.
Then Meade, on behalf of Meade Steel, approached representatives of African
Metals with an offer to sell the cathodes representing that he had seen them
packed and loaded in a railroad car in Canada and presented samples with
furthei" representations of quality. The offer was accepted. Payment was
made not to Meade Steel but by checks to the order of its office stenographer
for the alleged purpose of concealing the transaction from competitors. Secrecy
apparently was desired as the materials were shipped from Canada to Ger-
many for reshipment to Italy against whom the League of Nations had im-
posed sanctions, including an embargo on metal shipments, owing to the Ethi-
opian war. These checks were indorsed to Teeter's' firm for deposit in the
Bullowa account. It is important to 'note that Brenner was paid $149,682
for the cathodes. The Bullowa account received $152,399, leaving an apparent
profit of $2,717 on the transaction. In other words the defendants, too, paid
for cathodes without receiving them. The question presented is who shall
bear the loss occasioned by the wrong of a third party?
The trial court, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, directed a verdict
in favor of the defendants Bullowa, Meade, and Teeter, and against the defen-
dant Meade Steel.2  The Appellate Division held Meade liable also.3  The
plaintiff then went to the Court of Aplieals which found the evidence against
Bullowa and Teeter sufficient to establish a prima facie case of joint venture
and remanded for a new trial as to all the individual defendants.. Three
judges dissented without opinion.4
There is no dbubt that African Metals could rescind the contract of sale
and demand restitution on two theories: (1) fraud and misrepresentation, 5
lBullowa had largely financed the corporation by investing $5,000 in preferred stock,
This stock soon was retired. In addition to this capital there were 75 shares of common
stock of one dollar par value equally divided among the three owners. At the time of
the transaction in question the corporation had a $19.00 bank balance and total assets
of $623.00.2Supreme Court, New York County, entered Mar. 8, 1941, unreported.
3262 App. Div. 698, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 949 (1st Dep't 1941).4Lehman, C.J., Loughran and Lewis, JJ.5Monier v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 82 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) ; Seneca
Wire and Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., Inc., 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700 (1928).
Held, where the defendant misrepresented facts upon which the plaintiff relied, there
may, be a recovery "at law as the plaintiff wants its money returned. That the state-
ments were false in fact is sufficient for recovery. See generally, 5 WILISTOX, CoN-
TRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson, 1936) §§ 1457, 1500, 1509, 1511; RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 347.
Formerly, where a seller misrepresented a material fact and in reliance thereon the
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and (2) failure of consideration.6 Since it chose the former, Meade Steel
became liable as principal to restore the consideration received even though the
representations were made by its agent Meade.7 It is likewise true that Meade
was liable for his misrepresentation even though Meade Steel might have
received the consideration.8 Meade Steel and Meade apparently admitted
liability by their failure to appeal.
Since a judgment against Meade Steel and Meade would not have been
satisfied, African Metals sought to go behind the corporate entity and recover
against Bullowa and Teeter who seemingly could satisfy the claim.
The majority opinion by Judge Finch states, ". . . there is ample evidence
from which a jury could find that Meade, Bullowa and Teeter were joint co-
adventurers and were equally responsible for the acts of [each other].",)
The joint venture theory assumes two or more principals acting together in a
common enterprise.10 The majority opinion might have been based on either
of tvo lines of reasoning: (1) the corporation co6perated with Meade, Bul-
Iowa, and Teeter in the joint venture, or (2) the individuals detoured the
corporation by engaging in a joint venture independently of it.
A corporation may not become a partner in a business unless so authorized
by its charter, for a partnership would deprive the corporate officers and direc-
tors of complete control." But courts have differentiated joint venture from
partnership, thereby allowing a corporation to engage in a joint enterprise.' 2
As a logical matter such a distinction should not and perhaps does not exist,
since the corporation loses control in either case. 13 Perhaps the courts will
buyer paid the seller, restitution and damages were alternative remedies. Weigel v.
Cook, 237 N. Y. 136, 142 N. E. 444 (1923). After September 1, 1941, the doctrine
of election of remedies applicable to this situation was abolished in New York. N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. AcT § 112e, provides: "A claim for damages sustained as a result of fraud
or misrepresentation . . . , shall not be deemed inconsistent with a claim . . . based on
rescission. In an action for rescission . . . the aggrieved party shall be allowed to
obtain complete relief in one action.. .. "
The representations necessary for rescission may be innocent, whereas an action for
damages based on fraud requires knowledge that the facts are misstated. RESTATEMENT,
'CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 470, 471, 476 comment b. See also, an interesting opinion in
Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. McQuade, 123 F. (2d) 337 (App. D. C. 1941)
holding that where a misapprehension of a party concerning his legal rights results from
the misleading conduct of the other party, the latter should not be permitted to claim
the benefits.6Where A pays money and B fails to perform, restitution may be had on a basis of
failure of consideration. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 347.
7Seneca Wire and Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., supra note 5.8Laud v. Clifford, 254 N. Y. 216, 172 N. E. 475 (1930) holding that individual officers
of a corporation may be joined in an action to rescind a purchase induced by the fraud
of the officers and the corporation and to recover the amount paid.
9288 N. Y. at 84, 85, 41 N. E. (2d) at 469.
'
0 See Note (1920) 33 HAuRv. L. REv. 852 and cited authority, where partnership andjoint venture are distinguished.
"Consolidated Furniture Manufacturers v. Goldstein, 140 Cal. App. 563, 35 P. (2d)
627 (1934) ; Blair v. Southern Clay Mfg. Co., 173 Tenn. 571, 121 S. W. (2d) 570 (1938).
'
2 Central Lumber Co. v. Schilleci, 227 Ala. 29, 148 So. 614 (1933); Bates v.
Coronado Beach Co., 109 Cal. 160, 41 Pac. 855 (1895) ; Nolan v. J. & M. Doyle Co.,
338 Pa. 398, 13 A. (2d) 59 (1940); Wyoming-Indiana Oil and Gas Co. v. Westbn,
43 Wyo. 526, 7 P. (2d) 206 (1932).1
-
3Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventurers (1931) 15 MINN. L. Rav. 644 at 651
et seq.; Crane v. Stokke, 65 S. D. 207, 272 N. W. 811, 110 A. L. R. 731 (1937).
1942]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
continue to adopt the distinction to escape the stringency, of the rule making it
idtra vires for a corporation to enter into a partnership.'4 Where a corpora-
tion retains control of the partnership or joint venture there is no problem.15
But what is the legal effect when a corporation joins with its sole owners in a
joint venture? It is clear that the owners are the corporation, and as a prac-
tical matter control is not lost by this joint venture. Therefore, Meade Steel
could be a coadventurer with its owners, and all would be liable as principals
for the acts of each other.
The same result also might be reached if Meade, Bullowa, and Teeter acted
independently of Meade Steel in this transaction, 16 for they would become
liable as principals in a joint venture and Meade Steel would become liable as
their agent.' 7 One coadventurer, such as Meade, may create a liability for
Bullowa and Teeter without reference to their moral guilt or innocence, and
even. though they are not directly involved in the transaction.' Normally,
shareholders are liable to corporate creditors only for the amount of their
unpaid subscriptions.' 9  The corporate entity will be disregarded,20 however,
when used to justify a wrong, or protect a fraud,2 ' or whenever it is asserted
t4See Mechem, supra note 12 at 653, n. 13.
15Consolidated Furniture Manufacturers v. Goldstein, supra note 11; Bates v. Coro-
nado Beach Co., supra note 12 (contract, was one of joint adventure and since the entire
management and control was left to the corporation, it could not be regarded as
ultra' vires).
16Judge Crouch, writing for the court in Natelson v. A. B. L. Holding Co., 260 N. Y.
233 at 238, 183 N. E. 373 at. 374 (1932) said: "It is true that the law permits indi-
viduals to incorporate their business as a cover and for the very purpose of escaping
liability; but the business so incorporated must be carried on by the corporation, not by
the individuals; and its profits must be available to meet liabilities before the individuals
may share." (Italics added.) See also, Dunaway v. Anderson, 22 Cal. App. 691, 136
Pac. 309 (1913) holding that an officer of a corporation is liable where he contracts
individually and not as an officer, and it is no concern to him that the corporation is
also liable.
I7 Adolph Ramish, Inc. v. Laugharn, 86 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 9th 1936); Pacific
Can Co. v. Hewes, 95 F. -(2d) 42 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ; Harvey v. Hofmann, 121 N. J.
Eq. 523; 191 Atl. 756 (1937).
38Downey, v. Finucane, 205 N. Y. 251, 98 N. E. 391 (1912). This view has been
accepted in most jurisdictions and it is held that there is the same element of mutual
agency in'joint ventures as in partnerships. Contra: Tufts v. Mann, 116 Cal. App. 170,
2 P. (2d) 500 (1931) ; Keyes v. Nims, 43 Cal. App. 1, 184 Pac. 695 (1919).
19STEVENs, Cds'ORArIONS (1936) § 171.20See Horowitz, Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations (1939) 14 WASH.
L. REv. 284; (1940) 15 WASH. L...REv. 1 where the author suggests a possible test:
"1. (a) If there is an overt: intention to regard or disregard the corporate entity, effect
will be giveri thereto unless go'to do will violate a duty owing. (b) The overt intention
is that of the corporation whose entity is sought to be disregarded or of a person or
persons owning its stock and sought to be visited with the consequence of regard or
dist'egard of the corporate entity. (c) The duty owing must be owing to the person
seeking to invoke the doctrine, and such duty may arise from the common law and
equity, contract or' statute. 2. Where rights of a third party are not prejudiced, a cor-
porate entity may be disregarded in determining the rights of the immediate parties
interested as 'a matter of convenience-to them (e.g., obviating further litigation) in
order to enforce a duty owing."21United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (E. D.
Wis. 1905) ; Quaid v. Ratkowsky, 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N. Y. Supp. 812 (1st Dep't
1918), aff'd without opinion, 224 N. Y. 624, 121 N. E. 887 (1918).
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for a purpose inconsistent with the policy of the law in maintaining the con-
cept of the corporate entity.22 It is to this theory of independent action that
the majority referred by stating that "there is no evidence or inferences that
these defendants were not joint venturers dealing personally in this enter-
prise."23 Therefore the cause was remanded to allo' the plaintiff to prove
that Meade, Bullowa, and Teeter acted independently of Meade Steel in a
joint venture.
It is unfortunate that the three dissenting judges failed to explain their
position in an opinion. It seems that they wished to affirm the Appellate
Division without opinion, but no clue is given as to the theory upon which they
would deny liability.
They might have reasoned that African Metals made payment solely in
reliance on the documents presented by Meade as agent for Meade Steel,
since it did not know that Bullowa and Teeter participated in the deal.24
Further, Meade Steel was a distinct corporate entity and, as the plaintiff had
already taken judgment against it as principal, it could not also recover against
Teeter and Bullowa on the ground that the corporation was their agent.25
The most convincing argument is, however, that there was no evidence of
fraud by Teeter or Bullowa, or that they used Meade Steel as a mere instru-
mentality or agent to transact their own business.2 6 Divesting Meade Steel
of the payments made to the personal account of Bullowa was not considered
sufficient for liability although this method of financing seems to be the real
basis for the majorfty decision. The dissenting judges agreed with the defen-
dants, that this was the "proper method" of handling such a transaction,
2 2 STE'Vs, CoRPoRATIONS (1936) §§ 3, 19.
2-3288 N. Y. at 85, 41 N. E. (2d) at 470. (Italics added.)
24Almirall and Co., Inc. v. McClement, 207 App. Div. 320, 202 N. Y. Supp. 139 (1st
Dep't 1923), aff'd witiwut opinion, 239 N. Y. 630, 147 N. E. 225 (1925), is relied
upon in the defendant's brief. Here it was held that persons dealing with corporations
must look to the corporate assets and not to the individual stockholders. Recovery was
denied because it was not alleged, inter alia, that the defendants received the profits of
the enterprise. The case is therefore distinguishable.
Reliance upon all of the joint venturers is not necessary. Downer v. Finucane," supra
note 18; Jones v. Gould, 209 N. Y. 419, 103 N. E. 720 (1913). On the liability of un-
disclosed principals see MacHaiiw, OUTLINES OF AGENCY (3d ed. 1923) § 464 et seq.
and cases cited pointing out that reliance is not necessary to hold an undisclosed
principal.
2 5Georgi v. Texas Co., 225 N. Y. 410, 122 N. E. 238 (1919) is cited in the defendant's
brief. But this case does not support their contention. The opinion states that where
the agent and principal were both known to the plaintiff and he elected to obtain a
judgment against one, he was barred from further action ly his election. Where the
principal was undisclosed at the time of the suit against the agent there was no binding
election. This doctrine of election of remedies was expressly changed by statute in
New York in 1939. A plaintiff may now proceed separately or concurrently against
an agent or his undisclosed principal until a judgment against one is wholly satisfied.
N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT, § 112b.2 6 The entire ownership of the capital stock or control of the corporation is not enough
to justify the courts in disregarding the corporate entity; the amount of capital is not
in itself sufficient to establish a relationship of principal and agent between the stock-
holders and the corporation. Rapid Transit Subway Construction Co. v. City of New
York, 259- N. Y. 492, 182 N. E. 145 (1932); Hansen v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10
N. E. (2d) 259 (1937).
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following the argument that as the $25,000 credit was secured by bills of lading
when they were delivered to African Metals, the payments to the account
replaced the security 6f the bills of lading in the revolving operation. The
dissent might be explained on the theory that even if Meade Steel had con-
trolled its own finances, as opposed to the Bullowa account method, only the
profit, if any, on the transaction would be available to the plaintiff, and since
there was merely an inference of a profit to the Bullowa account, no liability
should be imposed.2 7 Any one of these factors might have led these judges to
conclude that the misguided defendants should not be held to full liability of
over fifty times the total profits as joint adventurers. This dissent is easy to
understand but difficult to sustain.
With respect to the business problem, it is clear that one should hesitate
to advise the separate account method of corporate financing in the light of
this decision. Bullowa seemed protected under this scheme, as did his money,
but instead he was subjected to full liability for the plaintiff's loss. While a
direct loan to Meade Steel would have lacked security and jeopardized the
$25,000, it would have avoided this full liability.28  A conditional escrow
arrangement might have been worked out whereby a third party would have
held all the cash or bills of lading in a revolving fund giving Bullowa prior
claim tipoi this property for $25,000.29 The liability of Bullowa and Teeter
should not be denied because of the failure to prove profits as this is imma-
terial if the defendants are joint adventurers; their liability depends not on
profits but upon misrepresentation. Profits become important only if the
corporate entity is fully recognized, thus making Bullowa, Teeter, and Meade
constructive trustees of the profits for Meade Steel.
In view of this analysis it is submitted that the court was presented with a
choice of oire of two logical positions: (1) if there were a joint venture, the
individual defendants were liable for the full loss; (2) if not, Bullowa, Teeter,
and Meade were liable as constructive trustees of the profits.8 0  In opposing
27Actual profits to Bullowa were not proven although the inference from the evidence
pointed to a $2,717 balance. The defendants claimed these profits were consumed in
expenses and shipping costs. But the plaintiff disputes this, and on appeal from a
nonsuit he is entitled to have the truth of the plaintiff's evidence assumed, together with
every reasonable inference therefrom. Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 285 N. Y.
389, 34 N. E. (2d) 368 (1941).28A director may advance money to the corporation, may become its creditor, may
take fr6m it a mortgage or other security, and may enforce the same like any other
creditor. Harr v. Wells-Newtbn Nat. Corp., 244 App. Div. 288, 278 N. Y. Supp. 933
(1st Dep't 1935); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936)
§ 1533; 2 THOMPSON, CORPoRATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 1352, 1353. In the instant case,
little security was available. Without security the lender is but a general creditor.
6 THoMPsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed 1927) §§ 5018, 5024 and cited cases.29See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 212.
Teeter's firm could be escrow-holder holding the bills of lading and funds received in
payment. There is a growing body of authority allowing a delivery to the grantee as
escrow-holder rather than to a third party. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 101,
103.
S0Where a party in a fiduciary relationship seeks the interest of himself rather than
that of the beneficiary, he may be made a constructive trustee of the property so gained.
See BooERP, TRiuJSTS (2d ed. 1942) §§ 55, 62; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 206;
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1936) § 160 et seq.
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full recovery on the joint venture theory, the dissent does not seem justified
in swinging to a third and illogical extreme of wholly excusing Bullowaand
Teeter from personal liability; at least, they should have suggested remanding
on the question of corporate profits withheld by Bullowa and Teeter. The
majority, by making Bullowa and Teeter explain their relationship with
Meade Steel, seems to have justly chosen the first position stated above, even
though these controlling directors and shareholders, by the choice of this
business method of safeguarding a proposed maximum advance of $25,000
credit to the corporation, now face the possibility of full liability to an amount
of six times that sum for the fraud of another.
Richard W. Cooney*
Lalor Law: Seamen on strike as mutineers.--Even when a ship is docked
in a safe harbor, seamen conducting a strike on board the ship are guilty of
mutiny. In Southern Steamship Company v. National Labor Relations Board,
316 U. S. 31, 62 Sup. Ct. 886 (1942),' the Court so held.2 The question
arose not on a criminal prosecution under the Federal Mutiny statute " but
in reference to the power of the National Labor Relations Board to reinstate
striking seamen.3 The steamship company had refused to negotiate with the
National Maritime Union, certified by the N.L.R.B. as the collective bar-
gaining representative of the company's seamen.4 In protest, the seamen
staged a strike on board their ship at Houston, Texas. Five of the seamen
were discharged for activity in the strike.5 The steamship company claimed
that it was justified in discharging the men, since they were guilty of mutiny,
*Third-year student, not a member of the QuARTERLY staff.
'Note (1942) 42 COL. L. Rv. 1053.
-This note is concerned with the case primarily as it affects admiralty law.
2135 STAT. 1106 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 484 (1927) ; 38 STAT. 1166 (1915), 46
U. S. C. A. § 701 (1915).3The dissent, written by Reed, J., with Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., concurring,
maintains that the N.L.R.B. did not go beyond its discretion in reinstating the strikers,
and distinguishes National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U. S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct. 490, 123 A. L. R. 599 (1938).
§ 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 1921 (1936) 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 160 (c) (1941) permits the Board to require an employer who has committed an
unfair labor practice to take "such affirmative action, including reinstatement of em-
ployees . . . , as will effectuate the policies of the Act [this chapter]." Said the court,
at p. 47: "It is sufficient for this case to observe that the Board has not been commis-
sioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it
may wholly ignore other and equally 'important Congressional objectives. Frequently
the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one
statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of an administrative
body that it undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its imme-
diate task."4Petitioner questioned the validity of an election held by the N.L.R.B. which named
the National Maritime Union as the collective bargaining representative of their em-
ployees, on the ground that the company representative was excluded from one of the
ships during the voting. The Board overruled the objection, and certified the National
Maritime Union 4 N. L. R. B. 1140.
523 N. L. R. B. 26 at 39.
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and that their conduct violated Sections 292 and 293 of the Criminal Code. 6
The N.L.R.B. reinstated the seamen, 7 and the decision was affirmed by the1
Circuit Court of Appeals.8 The Supreme Court has reversed the Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The elements of fact were such that a strong argument could be made out
for a right to strike. In refusing to negotiate with the union, the company
was guilty of committing an unfair labor practice. 9 There was no violence,
the ship was in no danger, and the owners suffered no loss.' 0 The Labor
Board argued that public policy as indicated by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act grants employees the right to strike and to bargain collectively."
Opposed to this the petitioner presented the traditional doctrine of the need
for strict discipline on board ship at all times, a a necessary requirement
to the maintenance of an efficient and safe merchant marine. In deciding
the case, the Supreme Court faced squarely the question of whether there
could be mutiny on a ship docked in a safe harbor, hitherto an open
question.12
The first mutiny statute was enacted in 1790.13 Under it, Justice Story
defined "revolt" as "the endeavor of a crew of a vessel, or any one of more
of them, to overthrow the legitimate authority of her commander, with
intent to remove him from his command, or against his will to take posses-
635 STAT. 1146 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 483, 484 (1927). The first section reads:
"Inciting revolt or mutiny on shipboard. Whoever, being of the crew of a vessel of
the United States, on the high seas, or any other waters within the admiralty or mari-
time jurisdiction of the United States, endeavors to make a revolt or mutiny on board
such vessel, or combines, conspires, or confederates with any other person on board to
make such revolt or mutiny, or solicits, incites, or stirs up any other of the crew to
disobey or resist the lawful orders of the master or other officers of such vessel, or to
refuse or neglect their proper duty on board thereof, or to betray their proper trust,
or assembles with others in a tumultuous and mutinous manner, or makes a riot on
board thereof, or unlawfully confines the master or other commanding officer thereof,
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
Section 484 reads: "Revolt or mutiny on shipboard. Whoever, being of the crew
of a vessel of the United States, on the high seas or on any other waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, unlawfully and with force,
or by fraud, or intimidation, usurps the command of such vessel from the master or
other lawful officer in command thereof, or deprives him of authority and command
on board, or resists or prevents him in the free and lawful exercise thereof, or transfers
such authority and command to another not lawfully entitled thereto, is guilty of a
revolt and mutiny, and shall be fined not more than $2,000 and imprisoned not more
than ten years."
723 N. L. R. B. 26.
8120 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 3d 1941) ; Note (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 360.
9316 U. .S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. at 890.
1023 N. L. R. B. at 37.
1NAT. LABOR RaL. AcT, § 8 (1), (3), (5), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1), (3), (5).
12316 U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. at 892. In People v. Rowe, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 980 (Co.
Ct. 1942) the court said that "an act of mutiny may occur even though the ship be
berthed, provided the ship is not in her home port." The court cited the principal case
as an authority for this proposition. No such distinction was made in the principal case.
'
3AcT 1790, c. 9, §§ 8, 12, 1 STAT. 113 and 115 (1790). The statute was designed to
suppress mutiny and piracy, and the penalty for making a revolt was death. For en-
deavoring to make a revolt, the punishment was imprisonment for not more than three
years, and a fiie not to exceed $1,000.
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sion of the vessel by assuming the government and navigation of her, or by
transferring their obedience from the lawful commander to some other
person."' 4 In another case he held that it was an endeavor to make a revolt
for part or all of the crew to refuse to do their duty or to disobey the orders
of their master.15 He did not limit the offense to the high seas. It could be
committed in a foreign or domestic harbor.'6 A revision of the mutiny
statutes in 1835 included Justice Story's definition of revolt.17 The present
statutes, enacted in 1909,18 are substantially the same as the 1835 revision,
and grant jurisdiction "on the high seas, or on any other waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States." These "waters"
include even the state territorial waters of our domestic ports.19 The essence
of mutiny, then, is the act of depriving the master of complete control of
his vessel or crew. A refusal to accept a new master, 20 or to obey the pilot's
orders,21 or to sail unless the master agrees to unreasonable demands,22 have
been held to constitute revolt, or inciting to revolt.
The first case of modern times follows the strict rule laid down by Justice
Story. In Hamilton v. United States,23 the ship Poughkeepsie was towed
into Granaway's Deep, about three miles from the harbor of Hamilton,
Bermuda, but considered part of the harbor.2 4 The crew had signed for a
six months' voyage, but before the repairs on the ship were completed, de-
manded to be paid off. They persisted after the master and the American
consul warned them that their acts constituted mutiny. Confining the original
crew in the hold, the master secured a new crew and sailed to New York,
where the strikers were convicted of endeavor to make a revolt. Although
they had committed no violence, and had not usurped command of the vessel,
they had deprived the master of authority. The case has been explained on
the grounds that the crew abandoned the ship in distress in a port of refuge.
In Rees et al v. United States,25 when the crew of the S.S. Algic refused
to work the vessel was between the inner and outer breakwaters at Monte-
14United States v. Kelley, 11 Wheat. 417 (U. S. 1826).
'
5 United States v. Hemmer, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,345 (C. C. D. Mass. 1825).
'
0 United States v. Keefe, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,509 (C. C. D. Mass. 1824) (in a
foreign port) ; United States v. Roberts, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,173 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1843)(in a dock at Havre, France); United States v. Hamilton, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,291
(C. C. D. Mass. 1816) (in Salem harbor); United States v. Gardner, 25 Fed. Cas.
No. 15,188 (C. C. D. Mass. 1829) (in Boston harbor).
174 STAT. 775 (1835). Revolt and mutiny were no longer punishable by death.
'sSnpra note 6.
19RoBINsON; ADMIRALTY (1939) 346.
20United States v. Hamilton, supra note 16; United States v. Cassedy, 25 Fed. Cas.
No. 14,745 (C. C. D. Mass. 1837) (refusal to sail when American consul in St. Helena
appointed a new master) ; United States v. Haines, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,275 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1829) (original master taken sick as ship left harbor and new master appointed;
crew's contention that they had signed only to sail with the original master denied) .2
'United States v. Lynch, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,648 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1843).22United States v. Gardner, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,188 (C. C. D. Mass. 1829).23Hamilton v. United States, 268 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 4th 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S.
645, 41 Sup. Ct. 15 (1920).24Supra note 19.
2595 F. (2d) 784 (C. C. A. 4th 1938), Note (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1294; see also,
ROBiNsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) 349-352, for discussion of the case and its aftermath.
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video. The sailing of the ship was delayed for twenty-four hours, and upon
her rettirn to the United States, the Maritime Commission had the men in-
dicted for mutiny.26" The court found that by shutting off the steam of the
cargo winches, in sympathy with a stevedores' strike then going on in Monte-
video, the seamen had made an unwarranted assumption of authority over
the vessel, and had violated the mutiny statute. It expressly refused to pass
on whether a crew of a ship docked in a safe harbor could strike, saying that
the question was not presented. The seamen's bargaining rights were held
to have ended with the signing of the shipping articles, and thereafter un-
questioned obedience to the orders of the master was necessary for the
safety of the ship and cargo.
A different approach, however, is indicated by the handling of a dispute
on the West Coast in 1935.27 All 374 members of the crew of the ship Cali-
fornia went on strike while the ship was moored in San Pedro harbor. They
alleged violations of statutory prohibitions against overtime and demanded
increased wages. The sailing of the ship was delayed three days, but other-
wise the crew performed their duties. Secretary of Labor Perkins called
the dispute a "strike", while Secretary of Commerce Roper demanded that
the Department of Justice prosecute the seamen for mutiny The case never
cdme to trial. In a Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 1935, Weisthoff v,.
American-Hewaiian S. S. Co.,28 watches had been broken on the early part
of the voyage, and when the ship was docked at New York, the seamen pre-
sented the master with a long list of demands, not all of which were con-
nected with their grievances. 20 They went on strike at the master's refusal
and police put the crew off the ship. The company tried to set up, as a
defense to a suit for wages'by the crew, the fact that under the Hamilton
case, their conduct constituted mutiny.30 Instead, the court called it "ill-
advised", and, granting the crew their wages, said that theirs was not the
gross misconduct resulting in a threat to safety which the mutiny statute
was designed to punish. 1
Commentators on the Weisthoff case concluded that the courts were bring-
ing up to date-their concept of seamen's rights, and granting to them equality
26The ship was owned by the Maritime Commission.27RoarNsox, AD IRALTY (1939) 344; Sapiro and Frank, Mutiny at the Dock (1936)
25 CALIF. L. REv. 41; Rothschild, The Legal Implications of a Strike by Seamen (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 1181, 1184.
2879 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 619, 56 Sup. Ct. 140
(1935).29These demands included: (1) Settle immediately the West Coast strike of 15,000
longshoremen and seamen, (2) Pay the 1929 Shipping Board wage scale, (3) Maintain
three watches, (4) Provide for all overtime at the rate of sixty cents per hour, (5)
Provide more and better food, (6) Make no discrimination against any of the crew,
(7) Discharge none of the crew, and (8) Recognize the Maritime Workers' Industrial
Union.
30Mutiny is generally considered to involve a forfeiture of wages. The Mentor, 17
Fed. Cas. No. 9,427 (C. C. D. Mass. 1825); The Shawnee, 45 Fed. 769 (E. D. Wis.
1891).
reUnited States v. Albers, 115 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 2d 1940). Seamen were held
guilty of an endeavor to make a revolt for refusing to work or leave the ship, after
their demand, in bad faith, that the master pay them half their wages at once.
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with workers on land, as far as the right to strike and to bargain collectively
were concerned.32 Whereas once all strikes were regarded as illegal, present
day policy on the economic rights of labor in general could find no reason
for treating as a felony a strike on a ship in a safe harbor.33 This conclu-
sion seemed justified two years later, in The Oakmar"4 and The Losmar,3 5
both civil cases, where the strikers were treated as trespassers, and nothing
more.
So stood the authorities at the time when the case here noted came on
for decision. The Labor Board and the lower courts followed the sugges-
tions of the recent commentators. The Supreme Court, however, now holds
that such acts of the strikers amount to mutiny. The Court says that it is
following a clear Congressional mandate in refusing to relax the rigor of
the rule, and goes to a considerable extent to indicate that Congress has
considered and rejected proposals to limit the crime to acts committed "on
ships under way on the high seas. '36 Despite the specific finding of the
N.L.R.B. that the ship was in no danger,37 and the policy that findings of
fact are not subject to review,3 8 the point is made that a ship is never safe
if the crew refuses to tend her, and the court cites the ever-present danger
of fire. Discipline on board ship must be maintained at all times, in order
to insure the safety of ships, cargo, and passengers at sea. This preoccupa-
tion of the court for safety runs through all the cases.8 9 In return for giving
up some of the rights of workers on land, the seaman is granted certain
privileges. His hours of work,4 0 living quarters,
41 food,42 heat,43 clothing,44
32Sapiro and Frank, supra note 25, at 51; Rothschild, supra note 25, at 1192.33See, on the general topic, Morris, Criminal Conrpiracy and Early Labor Combina-
tions in New York (1937) 52 POL. Sci. Q. 51-85; Mason, The Right to Strike (1928)
77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 52; Notes (1939) 39 COL. L. REV. 1369; (1937) 31 ILL. L. REV.
942.
3420 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1937), Notes (1937) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 132; (1938)
23 CORNELL L. Q. 302. Seamen no longer employed on the vessel staged a sit-down strike
but an admiralty court held that labor legislation had not superseded admiraltyjurisdiction.
35See, 20 F. Supp. 887 (D. Md. 1937), Notes (1937) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 132;
(1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 302. The strikers had left the ship when a "show-cause" order
was obtained, so the opinion that the strikers were trespassers is dictum.36Note 17 of the opinion quotes part of a letter from Emory S. Land, Chairman of
the Maritime Commission, to the House of Representatives Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, in which the Chairman unequivocally opposes such a measure
as tending to destroy the authority of the master.
3723 N. L. R. B. at 37.
381f there is supporting evidence the court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the Board. National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 206,
226, 60 Sup. Ct. 493, 503 (1940).39Peninsular and Occidental S. S. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 98 F. (2d)
411 (C. C. A. 5th 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 653, 59 Sup. Ct. 248 (1938), Note
(1939) 18 ORE. L. REv. 128; Texas Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 120 F. (2d)
186 (C. C. A. 9th 1941); Escandon v. Pan-American Foreign Corp., 88 F. (2d) 276
(C. C. A. 5th 1937) ; O'Hara v. Luckenbach, supra note 44.
4038 STAT. 1164 (1915), 46 U. S. C. A. § 673 (1926).
4129 STAT. 688 (1897), 46 U. S. C. A. § 80 (1926).
4217 STAT. 277 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 713 (1926).
4317 STAT. 270 (1872), 23 STAT. 56 (1884), 46 U. S. C: A. §§ 669, 670 (1926).
4417 STAT. 270 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 669 (1926).
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and medicine45 are all regulated by statute. This solicitude is intended to
benefit the seaman only incidentally; the primary concern of Congress in
enacting this legislation is to insure the safety and efficiency of our merchant
marine.46
In the past there has been criticism of the courts in the method used to
promote safety at sea; better working conditions, it is said, would achieve
that end sooner than penalties for misconduct.4 7 The Supreme Court places
its trust in the traditional doctrine of strict discipline and the authority of
the master, wherever the ship may be, and invokes the mutiny statute. The
holding goes further indeed than a mere interpretation of the criminal statute
defining a mutiny. The result of the current decision is that if there is a
mutiny the men may not only be open to prosecution for it, but also the
National Labor Board has lost jurisdiction over their reinstatement if they
have been discharged for participation in it. Just how far in other particu-
lars mutiny spells ouster for the Board lies with the future.
Daniel J. Keane, Jr.*
Legislation: Constitutionality: Payment of 'poll tax as a prerequisite to
voting in a federal election.- While the nation is engaged in a war against
the foreign enemies of democracy, an issue of domestic democracy has been
raised in the Congress. Senator Pepper of Florida has introduced a bill'
to rfiake unlawful the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a pre-
requisite to voting in a primary or general election for national office. Since
there is no such federal tax this is a blow at certain states2 and their policy
of election controls. Whether it can properly be aimed at state control in
the matter of federal elections, or even state elections within the state, is
the subject of inquiry in this note.
Constitutional authority for such federal legislation seems grounded on
Article I, Section 4, of the United States Constitution, which states:
"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
4517 STAT. 270 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 666 (1926).
460'Hara v. Luckenbach S., S. Co., 269 U. S. 364, 46 Sup. Ct. 157 (1926).4 7Rothschild, The Legal Inplcations of a Strike by Seamen (1936) 45 YALE L J.
1181, 1182-1184.
*Third-year student, not a member of the QuARTER.LY staff.
IS. 1280, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., March 31, 1941, 87 CONG. REc. 2698.
2 There are eight states making such a requirement: ALA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1940)
Tit. 17, § 12; STAT. OF ARK. (1940) § 4695; GA. CODE (1933) § 2-603; MISS. CODE
ANN. (Mobley, 1938) § 2036; S. C. Civ. CODE (1932) § 2267; TENN. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1938) § 2027; TEX. STAT. (Vernon, 1941) art. 2955; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1936) § 109.
The annual amounts of the tax are: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) Tit. 51, § 238
($1.50); STAT. OF ARK. (1940) § 11572 ($1.00) ; GA. CODE (1933) § 2-5004 (not to
exceed $1.00); Miss. CODE ANN. (Mobley, 1938) § 3127 ($2.00); S. C. Cirv. CODE
(1932) § 2565 ($1.00) ; TENN CODE ANN. (Michie, 1938) § 1082 ($1.00) ; TEX. Co NsT.
ART. VII § 3 ($1.00); VA. TAX CODE (Michie, 1938) § 22 ($1.50).
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thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators."
This provision must be distinguished from the Constitutional provision,
Article I, Section 2, clause 1, that the House of Representatives, and since
the Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate, shall be chosen by electors having
"the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
state legislature." 3  It seems clear that by these distinct provisions the
drafters of the Constitution intended to leave to the states the establishment
of federal voters' qualifications and to give Congress paramount power to
regulate only the times, places, and ranimer of holding elections for federal
office, with the exception concerning the "place" of Senatorial elections
indicated above, 4 which is itself now obsolete.
Thus Congress may legislate concurrently with the states 5 or alter the
state regulations. 6 Those state regulations which it does not alter, Congress
is deemed to have adopted.7 Similarly, Congress may restrict state action
by exercising its power under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution or
under the blanket authority to make necessary laws to execute its delegated
powers.8
The question then arises whether the requirement of poll tax payment as
a prerequisite to voting establishes the payment of the poll tax as a "quali-
fication" for voting. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Breedlove
v. SuttlesO that such a requirement is merely a police measure for the col-
30. S. CONST. ART. I, § 2.
'
4 See Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 255, 41 Sup. Ct. 469 (1921) ; FEDERAL-
IST LX; 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON CONSTITUTION (1883) §§ 813-819; 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES (1827) 45-64; 2 id. 22-36; 3 id. 60. The commentaries provide a well reasoned
rationale for the provisions. In the first instance, regulation of elections was left in the
hands of local authorities most familiar with the situation. But Congress has paramount
power to prevent inequalities among state regulations, and also to prevent its own
dissolution, should a recalcitrant state refuse to provide for a federal election. The
exception as to place of Senate elections appears to have been designed to prevent
Congress's inconveniencing state legislatures by providing for an election of Senators
ait a place different from the place of the, legislature's regular sessions. The reason
for this disappeared when the state legislatures ceased to elect the state senators. See
U. S. CONST. AMEND. XVII which supersedes ART. I, § 3, cl. 1 of the original
Constitution. Today Senators and Representatives are generally chosen through the
same election machinery. Hence this exception seems to have little practical impor-
tance today.
5Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 388, 25 L. ed. 717 (1879) ; Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U. S. 651, 662, 4 Sup. Ct. 152 (1884) ; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263
(1888) ; United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, 35 Sup. Ct. 904 (1915); Burroughs
and Cannon v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 54 Sup. Ct. 287 (1934), and see Logan
v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 293, 12 Sup. Ct. 617 (1892).
6See Ex parte Siebold, supra note 5 at 383; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476,
482, 37 Sup. Ct. 407 (1916) ; Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 255, 262, 290,
41 Sup. Ct. 469 (1921); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932);
FEDERALIST LIX; 3 FARRAND, REcoRDs OF FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911) 311.
7See Ex parte, Siebold, supra note 5 at 388; In re Green, 134'U. S. 377, 380, 10 Sup. Ct.
586 (1890) ; United States v. Gradwell, supra note 6 at 482; Boudin, State Poll Taxes
and the Federal Constitution (1941) 28 VA. L. REv. 1.
8U. S. CoAsT. ART. I, § 8; see, United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 315. 61 Sup.
Ct. 1031 (1941).
9Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U. S. 277, 58 Sup. Ct. 205 (1937).
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lection of state taxes and not a "qualification" for voting. This decision
seems grounded upon two propositions-one historical o and the other
logical.'1
Historically, the poll tax in America seems to have arisen as an exercise
of the state police power to compel labor upon the state highways. 12  The
American poll taxes were uniform, unlike the English poll taxes which were
graduated and payable in money.18 In America, laboring on the highways
"was no more the payment of a tax than training in the militia would have
been."'1 4 Hence it developed that when states later permitted the commuta-
tion of the labor requirement into money, the poll tax was considered sui
generis and not subject to the usual statutory provisions regulating
assessment. 15
The second ground for the Breedlove decision seems to be the logical
notion of class identity. The usual poll tax levy specifies certain exempt
groups, such as the blind,16 physically disabled males,17 and those who have
served in the state militia.' 8 These exempt groups may be eligible to vote.
Consequently, the class of voters may not be identical with the class of poll
taxpayers, and it is therefore felt that the poll tax assessment is not logically
a qualification for voting.
It has been urged that since the poll tax requirement is not a qualification
for voting, it must be a tax on voting,19 but such a conclusion appears to
mistake the verbal form of the Breedlove decision for its logical ground. The
same logical nicety has been employed to hold the poll tax not to be a tax
on voting.20
Refutation of both the historical and logical support for the Breedlove
decision may be found in an examination of the practical political results of
requiring poll tax payment as a prerequisite to voting. It is first to be noted
that today the poll tax is a money tax, usually for the support of schools,
10302 U. S. 277, 281, 58 Sup. Ct. 205 (1937).
11Id. at 282.
121 COOLEY, TAXATION (3d ed. 1903) 16-17.
'aThe English poll taxes were based on the wealth of the individual. They produced
revenue disproportionate to the administrative burden, and were abandoned after 1698.
3 DoWELL, HISTORY OF TAXATION (1888) c. 1.
14Amenia v. Stanford, 6 Johns. 92 (N. Y. 1810).
151 COOLEY, op. cit. mipra note 12; Galloway v. Tavares, 37 Fla. 58, 19 So. 170 (1896);
Sawyer v. Alton, 3 Scam. 127 (Ill. 1840); State v. Topeka, 36 Kan. 76, 85, 12 Pac.
310 (1886) ; Short v. Maryland, 80 Md. 392, 397, 31 Atl. 322 (1895) ; and see Johnston
v. Macon, 62 Ga. 645, 652 (1879) ; Starksboro v. Hinesburgh, 13 Vt. 215, 217 (1841).
Contra: Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396, 399 (1874); Hassett v. Walls, 9 Nev.
389 (1874); State v. Halifax, 4 Dev. 295, 298 (N. C. 1833) semble.
'
6 ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) Tit. 51, § 238; GA. COE (1933) § 92-108; TENN.
CODE: ANN. (Michie, 1938) § 1082; TEX STAT. (Vernon, 1941) § 2959.
17Miss. CODE ANN. (Mobley, 1938) § 3127; S. C. CIV. CODE (1932) § 2563; TENN.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1938) § 1082; TEx. STAT. (Vernon, 1941) § 2959; VA. TAx CODE
(Michie, 1936) § 22.
18ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) Tit. 51, § 238.
19Boudin, supra note 7 at 17.2OThis logical nicety led a federal court to hold that the poll tax is not a tax On
federal voting. Pirtle v. Brown, 118 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 6th 1941) ; Note (1942) 139
A. L. R. 561.
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and payment in labor is not offered as an alternative to money payment.21
Printed in the margin are figures indicating the number of voters deprived
of their ballot by the poll tax requirement. 22 Such figures appear persuasive
of the conclusion that the payment of the poll tax is a tangible qualification
for voting in those states requiring such payment as a prerequisite to voting. 2
Further evidences of the present day political nature of the poll tax may
be found in the requirement of some states that the poll tax lists be kept by
color ;24 in the statutes declaring it a crime to pay the poll tax of another ;25
in the exemption of females not registering to vote ;26 or in the accumulation
of poll taxes due before voting is permitted. 27 That the poll tax is a part
of the technique, of disenfranchisement is manifest.
The Supreme Court in the past has looked behind the terms of the statu-
tory qualifications for federal voting. After the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment, some states established as a qualification for voting a reading
test coupled with a provision that no person entitled to vote before a specified
date, or a lineal descendant of such a person, shall be disqualified on the
basis of the reading requirement. 28 The Court held that while these provi-
2 1 ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) Tit. 51, § 237; ARx. STAT. (1940) § 4693; GA.
CODE (1933) § 2-5004; Miss. CODE ANN. (Mobley, 1938) § 3127; S. C. CIV. CODE(1932) § 2565; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1938) § 1082; TEX. STAT. (Vernon, 1941)§9 2959, 2961; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 109.
22 No-requirement Requirement
Year States' U. S. as a whole States
1900 80% 75% 38%
1920 46% 40% 16%
1940 73% 63% 21%(Figures indicate the percentages of otherwise qualified voters who cast ballots in
presidential elections.) Statistics published by Southern Electoral Reform League at
Richmond, Virginia.
It is to be noted that in some southern states the primaries substantially determine
the course of the elections, and consequently voters may be disinclined to vote at the
elections. Hence these figures are not conclusive comparisons. However, they are
illuminating.
The following primary figures are incomplete but illustrative:




Alabama 1932 23.4(The figures in the table indicate the highest vote cast in either general or primary
elections during the period 1920-40.) The average vote in the presidential elections of
1928 and 1932 of the neighboring no-requirement states of Kentucky and West Virginia
was 68% and 79% respectively. 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 14 (1941).230bviously, the same analysis may be used to show that the poll tax is a tax on voting.
If such a conclusion is adopted, then Mr. Boudin's discussion of the limitations on the
state's power to tax a federal function becomes pertinent. See Boudin, supra note 7 at 17.2 4 ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) § 244; ARK. STAT. (1940) § 4696; VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1936) § 109.25TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. (Vernon, 1938) Art. 203.
26GA. CODE (1933) § 92-108.
2 7ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) Tit. 17, § 12 (all poll taxes due since 1901 must
be paid) ; GA. CODE (1933) § 2-603 (all poll taxes due since adoption of constitution);
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 109 (all poll taxes due for preceding 3 years).




sions contained no express terms abridging the right of persons to vote on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the provisions
did result in such an abridgement.29 Within the principle of these decisions
and measured by its effects the poll tax requirement is in the same category
whether it be considered a revenue measure or a qualification for voting.
It is submitted that Constitutional authority exists for dealing with the
type of legislation here discussed.30 If the requirement of the payment of
a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting be considered an exercise of the state's
police power, rather than the establishment of an added qualification for
voting, Congressional action is clearly possible. The right of qualified voters
to vote and to have their votes counted is secured by the Constitution,31 and
is secured against both individual and state action.32 In the past the Supreme
Court has upheld Congressional legislation designed to preserve the integrity
of the ballot.3 3 Recently the Court has extended the Constitutional concept
of "election" to include the primaries which are an integral part of a federal
election.3 4 It would seem,, therefore, that Congress would act within the
scope of its authority if it were to declare illegal the collection of the poll
tax as a condition precedent to voting in a federal election or a primary
conducted as an integral part thereof.3 5
Another possible ground for such a statute is the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, with Congress operating through the empowering
Section five thereof.3 6 Whether a state statute violates this clause depends
upon whether the distinction drawn by the statute is reasonably adapted to
the purpose of the statute.37 When a state requires payment of a poll tax
29Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 35 Sup. Ct. 926 (1915) ; Myers v. Anderson,
238 U. S. 368, 35 Sup. Ct. 932 (1915).
S01t should, of course, be noted that regardless of its label, the poll tax requirement
produces the same anti-democratic results.3aUnited States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 314, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031 (1941) and cases
there cited.
32Ibid.
33Thus Congress has outlawed the use of fraud and violence in influencing federal
voters and has been upheld by the Court. Ex parte Yarbrough, supra note 5; Burrough
and Cannon v. United States, supra note 5.
Similarly, legislation outlawing fraudulent handling of federal ballots has been passed
by Congress and sustained by the Court. It re Coy, supra note 5.3 4United States v. Classic, rupra note 31 at 314; and see concurring opinion of Pitney,
J., in Newberry v. United States, supra note 4 at 275. To fall within the scope of a
statute such as here discussed, a primary would apparently have to meet the tests
established in the Classic case.
35Circuity of argument on this point can be avoided only by careful qualification of
the above statements. To say that the right of qualified voters to vote is constitutionally
protected against state action is not to say that the state cannot establish, in the first
instance, its own qualifications for voters. See discussion supra. But once qualified as
a voter, the voter's right to his ballot is constitutionally protected. This consideration
indicates why Congressional action of the sort here discussed cannot be grounded on
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ex parte
Yarbrough, supra note 5 at 664; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 21 Sup. Ct. 17 (1900) ;
United States v. Classic, supra note 31 at 314; cf. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S.
487, 22 Sup. Ct. 783 (1902).
-36U. S. CONST., ART. XIV.3 7 DowLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTioNAL LAw (1941) 1084 et seq. It is to be noted
that the discussion at this point assumes that the poll tax is not a qualification for
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as a condition precedent to voting its ostensible purpose is to collect revenue
by means of this sanction.38 The extent to which such a sanction disenfran-
chises the lower sections of the population has been indicated above. The
income from poll taxes in states requiring payment as a condition precedent
to voting constitutes 1-2% ofthe total revenue of the state39 Since the ballot
is designed to protect the voter's rights, it seems arguable that the effect
of such discrimination among otherwise qualified voters is not reasonably
adapted to the revenue purpose of the tax. The argument for federal control
in the election of federal officers seems conclusive. There remains the question
as to how far Congress may go in affecting state elections.
If the poll tax requirement be considered a qualification then the historical
basis for such a qualification must be considered. Historically, both England
and the early American states required as a qualification for voting either
the ownership of property40 or the payment of taxes.41 While the early
requirements usually demanded a freehold interest in land, the growth of
towns led to recognition of personal property as a sufficient qualification.42
The rationale was that such a provision insured that the voter had a stake
in the government. 43 The same reasoning was given for the tax payment
requirement, 44 although it was sometimes stated that tax qualifications were
designed to limit the vote to those contributing to the support of the
government.45
To hold that the poll tax requirement is a qualification for voting, even
in state elections, is not to preclude Congressional action, for Congress may
act under its authority to guarantee each state a republican form of govern-
ment.40 As a result of its own investigations, Congress might reasonably
conclude that the traditional rationale for such a qualification is untenable
today. The expansion of governmental activities may be said to give others
besides property owners and taxpayers a stake in the government. Congress
might find that the statistics of disenfranchisement and the political tenor
of the statutes referred to above constitute an impairment of the republican
form of government. Such a finding would extend the scope of Congres-
sional power so that Congress could declare illegal the requirement of poll
tax payment as "a condition precedent to voting in a state as well as in a
federal election. The passage of a bill, such as the Pepper bill, which deals
voting and hence the historical justification for qualifications of this sort need not be
considered. Consideration of the historical justification of qualifications and discrimi-
nations of this sort is given below.38Breedlove v. Suttles, supra note 9; Pirtle v. Brown, supra note 20.39Statistics published by the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, U. of Pa.,
Popular Release $49 (1941).
4 0 SIMEoN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ELECTIONS (1789) 53 et seq.; Lxvxs AND PuT-
NaY, HAND3OOK OF ELECTION LAws (1912) 39 et seq.; and see Inhabitants of Windham
v. Inhabitants of Portland, 4 Mass. 384 (1808).41See Frieszleben v. Shallcross, 9 Houst. 1, 19 AtI. 576 (Del. 1890) ; Opinion of the
Judges, 46 Mass. 591 (1884) ; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563 (1875).
421 SEYmouR, How THE WORLD VOTES (1918) 207-17.
43Ibid; State v. Woodruff, 2 Day 504, 510 (Conn. 1807).44See Catlin v. Smith, 2 S. & R 267, 271 (Pa. 1816).4 5See Frieszleben v. Shallcross, supra note 42.
46U. S. CONST., ART. IV, § 4; and see Boudin, supra note 7 at 15.
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exclusively with federal elections, would probably mean that the poll tax
states would sever the state elections from the federal elections. Anticipatory
conditional legislation along this line has already been passed.47 To make
clear that Congress has the power and the intent to deal with even state elec-
tions, the legislative purpose of the pending legislation must be more dis-
tinctly formulated. If the Congress decides to eliminate the poll tax require-
ment only insofar as it affects federal elections, the present form of the
Pepper bill is adequate, provided that the Supreme Court will not hold the
poll tax requirement to be a qualification for voting within the Constitutional
language which deals with the topic of voting. But if the legislative purpose
of the proposed statute is to remove the anti-democratic effect of the poll
tax requirement in state as well as federal elections, then Congress must act
under the broader mandate.
It appears to be well established that what constitutes an impairment of
the republican form of government is a political determination, and one into
which the Supreme Court will not inquire.48 Congress apparently has consti-
tutional authority to declare illegal the requirement of the poll tax as a condi-
tion precedent to voting in both federal and state elections. It remains for
Congress to clearly formulate its legislative purpose and to cast a statute into
the mold most effective to achieve that purpose.
49
Monroe R. Lazere*
Legislation: Real property: Equity: Jury trial: Removal of encroach-
ment.-After nineteen years, the New York Legislature has abrogated the
rule resulting from the decision of City of Syracuse v. Hogan" that an equity
action may not be maintained for the removal of an encroaching structure. A
47PUBLic Acrs oF TENN. (1941) c. 115.
48Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 (1849) ; Pacific States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon,
223 U. S. 118, 32 Sup. Ct. 224 (1911) ; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U. S. 250, 256, 34 Sup.
Ct. 92 (1913); Davis v. Ohio, 241 U. S. 565, 36 Sup. Ct. 708 (1916); Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 234, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1916); Ohio v.
Akron Park District, 281 U. S. 74, 79, 50 Sup. Ct. 228 (1929) ; and see In re Duncan,
139 U. S. 449, 461, 11 Sup. Ct. 573 (1890).
In the cases cited, the state provisions involved were deemed to have been found by
Congress not to be an impairment of the republican form of government. In the instant
case, therefore, it would seem advisable that Congress make an express finding that the
poll tax requirement constitutes such an impairment.
"11At press time it is noted that the Geyer bill, analogue of the Pepper bill, was
passed by the House of Representatives on Octboer 13, 1942. H. R. 1024, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess., 88 CONG. REc. 8438.
Unlike the Pepper bill, the Geyer bill makes no express reference to primaries con-
ducted pursuant to federal elections. It would seem, however, that such a statute would
be applicable to primaries which are an integral part of such elections. Cf. United
States v. Classic, supra note 31.
*Third-year student, School of Law, Columbia University. A.B., Cornell University,
1938.
1234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923) as interpreted in Johnson v. Purpura, 208 App.
Div. 505, 203 N. Y. Supp. 581 (3d Dep't 1924).
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new section, proposed by the Law Revision Commission, has been added to the
New York Real Property Law :2
§ 539. Action for the removal of encroaching structures.
1. An action may be maintained by the owner of any legal estate in land
for an injunction directing the removal of a structure encroaching on such
land. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting the power
of the court in such an action to award damages in an appropriate case in
lieu of an injunction or to render such other judgment as the facts may
justify.
2. This section shall not be deemed to repeal or modify any existing
statute or local law relating to encroaching structures.3
The situation for which the statute provides a remedy is as simple as this:
The plaintiff and the defendant are adjoining owners; the plaintiff complains
that the defendant is erecting or maintaining on his property a structure which
encroaches on the plaintiff's land.
It is apparent that before any relief can be given, an issue of fact-the
ownership of the strip of land, if disputed-must be determined. Assuming
that the plaintiff will be able to prove his allegation of title to the satisfaction
of the fact-determining agency, what remedies are available to him?
The plaintiff may resort to self-help and remove the part of the structure
which he thinks encroaches upon his land. In so doing, he assumes the risk of
incurring liability for damage to a non-encroaching portion of the structure.
But self-help, even if privileged, can hardly be said to be an adequate remedy;
nor should self-help as a method of disencumbering the land be encouraged.4
To sue periodically at law for damages involves a multiplicity of suits. Not
only must actions be brought often enough to prevent the acquisition by the
defendant of a prescriptive interest in the strip of land,5 but they must be fre-
quent enough to avoid the barring of recovery by the Statute of Limitations
for any period of the continuing trespass.6
A single legal remedy remains-ejectment. A suit in ejectment will decide
the title, but a favorable judgment for the plaintiff will not, of itself, remove
the encroachment. The sheriff, burdened with the risk of incurring personal
liability for danage to non-encroaching parts of the structure will usually
return the writ of execution unsatisfied. An unenforceable judgment can
2N. Y. RF.AL. PROP. LAW § 539 (L. 1942, c. 321; April 3, 1942).
3The existing statutes or local laws, expressly preserved by the statute, are: N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. Acr § 992(2) ; N. Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 38(a) ; ADMIN. CODE OF r . CITY
OF N. Y. § 82d6-7.0.4For a discussion of the adequacy of the remedy of self-help, see Note (1932) 16
MINN. L. REv. 210.5Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34, 22 N. E. 441 (1889); Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228
N. Y. 296, 127 N. E. 239 (1920). In an action to recover real property in New York,
the plaintiff or his predecessor in title must have been seized of the premises within
fifteen years. N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 34.6In New York, an action to recover damages for an injury to real property must be
commenced within three years. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 49(7). Compensation can be
had only down to the date of the bringing of the action. Uline v. N. Y. C. & H. R.
Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536 (1886).
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hardly be said to be an adequate remedy. So holds the weight of authority.7
This, then, is the typical situation in which equity traditionally takes juris-
diction. Further, the remedy of a mandatory injunction directing removal
would place the burden of removal on the wrongdoer who erected or main-
tained the structure. This is clearly a more adequate remedy than any at
law.8
Prior to the Code of 1848, introducing simplified pleading, the plaintiff
would first establish his title in an action at law in ejectment-involving a jury
trial if the right thereto were not waived-and then file a bill in equity to
protect the right so established by an injunction directing the defendant to
remove the encroaching structure. 9 The procedure was simple; there was
little difficulty in pleading; restoration by the defendant, because of the sanc-
tion of imprisonment for contempt, was sure.
Upon the Code union of law and equity,1 0 problems, both of procedure and
substance, began to arise. The New York courts, in which legal and equitable
jurisdiction had been merged, at first permitted" and then required that the
title be determined and equitable relief be given in the one action.
In Hahl v. Sugo,' 2 it was held that all relief from a single infringement of a
7 CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1919) § 196; 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
(4th ed. 1919) § 1921; SPELLING AND LEwIs, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS (1926) § 101;
Baron v. Korn, 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804 (1891). Notes (1893) 20 L. R. A. 161;
(1921) 14 A. L. R. 831; (1924) 32 A. L. R. 463.8Baron v. Korn, 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804 (1891) ; cf. City of Syracuse v. Hogan,
234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923) ; Johnson v. Purpura, supra note 1.
9The general rule that the Court of Chancery was not the proper tribunal to try
disputed titles to land applied "not only to trespass on an alleged right to the exclusive
possession of real property, but also to all cases of alleged trespass to easements."
Lewis, Injunctions against Nuisances aid the Rule Requiring the Plaitiff to Establish
His Right at Law (1908) 56 U. OF PA. L. REv. 289, 296. Lansing v. The North River
Steamboat Co., 7 Johns Ch. 162 (N. Y. 1823) (Chancellor Kent). But see Belknap v.
Trimble, 3 Paige Ch. 577 (N. Y. 1832) (Chancellor Walworth). REPORT, REcomt-
MENDATION, AND STUDY OF THE LAW REvisION CO fISSION [Legis. Doc. (1942) No.
65 (c)], p. 12. Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 502. In New Jersey, legal rights are still
decided in the legal form. Richman v. Schwartz, 130 N. J. Eq. 495, 23 A. (2d) 388
(1941) ; Borough of West Long Branch v. Hoch, 99 N. .J. Eq. 356, 131 Atd. 889 (1926).
Criticized in Note (1926) 11 CORNELL L. Q. 547. Under the New Jersey Chancery Act
of 1915, the court, instead of dismissing the bill for want of equity= at once, retains
jurisdiction while the legal question is being determined or until there has been an
adequate opportunity to determine the same. N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) 2:29.9.
In England, the rule was changed by Chancery Regulation Act (Rolt's Act) 1862,
25 & 26 Vxcr. c. 42 (repealed by the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act,
1883, 46 & 47 Vicr. c. 49) which provided that the Court of 'Chancery in those cases
in which it ordinarily refused or postponed relief until after a trial at law should there-
after either determine the disputed question itself or direct an issue to a jury.
'
0 Section 8 of the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act provides: "There is only one form of civil
action. The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of
those actions and suits, have been abolished."
lCorning v. The Troy Iron and Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 191 (1869) ; Broiestedt v.
South Side R. Co., 55 N. Y. 220 (1873); Baron v. Korn, 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E.
804 (1891).
12169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901). The precise holding was that a judgment in
the first action if insufficient on the facts alleged in the complaint should have been
attacked by appeal and not collaterally by bringing a second action on the same set of
facts in equity. Cf. Blake v. McCarthy, 115 N. Y. Supp. 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
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primary right had to be sought in the one action, the theory being that under
the Code the plaintiff had from a single group of facts one cause of action
regardless of the forms and kinds of relief to which he was entitled. The
cause of action, whether typically legal or equitable or a combination thereof,
could not be split and was merged in the judgment.13
Then in City of Syracuse v. Hogan,4 an action for the removal of an en-
croaching structure was held to be in substance an action for the recovery of
real property and, as "an action of ejectment,"'15 within the trial by jury re-
quirement of the Civil Practice Act.' 6 The majority opinion pointed out
that holding that the action was in ejectment did not prevent the plaintiff
from obtaining all the relief to which he was entitled. The judgment settling
the title and awarding damages for loss of possession and for the probable cost
of restoring the land, continued the majority, was always enforceable, either
by execution or, that failing, by contempt proceedings against the defendant
for "refusing to comply with the judgment."' 7  The ambiguity of this latter
statement remained for future clarification-by another court.
This decision of the Court of Appeals was interpreted by the Appellate
Division in Johnson v. Purpurai8 as precluding the granting of a mandatory
injunction for the removal of an encroaching structure. An injunction was
held to be unnecessary since contempt proceedings against the defendant would
follow as a matter of right if the judgment for the plaintiff in ejectment could
not be executed. The legality of contempt proceedings in such a case has been
seriously questioned. 19
1 3 CLARIC, CODE PLEADING (1928) 75-9. As to what a Code cause of action is, see
Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YAx.x L. J. 817; McCaskill, Actions and
Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614; Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of
Action (1927) 25 MicH. L. REv. 393.
14Supra note 1. The Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative the certified ques-
tion: "Are the defendants entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right?" In a short
dissenting opinion, in which Pound and Crane, JJ., joined, Judge Cardozo suggested
that ejectment was not an adequate remedy, and that the issue of title did not have to
be determined first at law (citing cases after the adoption of the Code). Case criticized in
Notes (1923) 9 CORNELL L. Q. 73 and (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 707. Contra: Note (1923) 23
COL. L. REV. 590.15 Section 7(8) of the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr provides that the words "'an action of
ejectment'" refer to "an action to recover the immediate possession of real property."
'
6 Section 425 of the N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. Ac provides that in "An action of ejectment,"
"an issue of fact must be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived or a reference
is directed."
'
TSupra note 1, at 463. Section 505 of the N. Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr was cited as
applicable. It provides that a judgment which "is final and cannot be enforced by exe-
cution, as prescribed in" § 504 "may be enforced" by contempt proceedings. Section 504
provides that a final judgment in-favor of the plaintiff in an action of ejectment "may
be enforced by execution." There is disagreement as to whether "cannot" in § 505
refers to factual impossibility or lack of legal authorization. See note 19 infra.
'sSupra note 1, two justices dissenting. They interpreted the decision in City of
Syracuse v. Hogan, as requiring that the judgment, if unenforceable by execution, con-
tain a provision directing the, defendant to remove the structure. Otherwise, "there
would be no direction of the,Court, the refusal to 'obey' which would be punishable by
contempt as prescribed in the Civil Practice Act, section 505." Supra note 1, at 511.
Decision criticized in Note (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 536.
1 9
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. The recent enactment was designed to restore "the rule which long pre-
vailed in New York prior to City of Syracuse v'. Hogan."20  To have that
effect it must legislate out of existence the holdings of that case: (1) that every
action to recover the possession of real property is an action in ejectment;
(2) that in every such action the defendant is entitled to a jury trial as a
matter of right; and (3) that the legal remedy of ejectment is adequate since
the judgment can be enforced either by execution or, that failing, by contempt
proceedings.
21
The question arises whether in the action created-or revived-there should
be a jury determination of a disputed legal title.2 2 No answer is furnished by
the new section, its phraseology merely suggesting that the action under it is
to resemble what before the Code would have been a suit in equity.23 Under
Doc. (1942) No. 65 (c)], pp. 16-8. If contempt proceedings are not authorized the
ejectment judgment, if not enforceable by execution, would provide no adequate remedy.
A mandatory injunction would then be necessary to furnish complete relief.
201d. at 3.
21Although the question certified to the court related only to jury trial, all three
holdings were essential to the decision that the case was within the trial by jury
requirement of the Civil Practice Act.22Part IV of the REPORT, REcOMENDATION AND STUDY OF THE LAW REvIsiON Com-
MISSION [Legis. Doc. (1942) No. 65 (c)] is entitled: "Is a Jury Trial Required by the
Constitution?" The cautious conclusion reached is that "the Court of Appeals has
repeatedly affirmed judgments which granted injunctive relief directing the removal of
an encroachment in equity suits where all issues of fact, including that of title, were
determined by a court without a jury." The cases cited to support the conclusion are
of four types:
(1) Cases before the Code where the existence of the right or title was
certain: Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N. Y. 1816)
(private nuisance).
(2) Cases after the Code where the existence of the right or title was deter-
minable as a matter of law: Olmstead v. Loomis, 9 N. Y. 423 (1854) (construc-
tion of a deed; extent of right depended upon technical calculations) ; Williams
v. New York Central Ry. Co., 16 N. Y. 97 (1857) (power of municipal author-
ities to permit railroad to construct upon land dedicated to use of public by
plaintiff) ; Corning v. The Troy Iron and Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 191 (1869)
(where there was "no doubt as to the legal right") ; Broiestedt v. South Side R.
Co., 55 N. Y. 220 (1873) (interpretation of a state statute) ; City of New York
v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) (power of municipal authorities
to permit a permanent encroachment upon a public street) ; Herrman v. Hart-
wood Holding Co., 193 App. Div. 115, 183 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1st Dep't 1920)
(where the defendant made substantial changes in a party wall).
,(3) Cases after the Code where the defendant waived his right to a jury
trial: Baron v. Korn, 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804 (1891) ; Carroll v. Bullock,
207 N. Y. 567, 101 N. E. 438 (1913) (where the defendant insisted upon trial
by the court).
(4) Cases not in point where the judge used general language: Smith v.
Carll, 5 Johns. Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1821) (whether a question of insanity in an
equity suit should be referred to a jury) ; Jamaica Savings Bank v. M. S.
Investing Co., 274 N. Y. 215, 8 N. E. (2d) 493 (1937) (where in a suit for
a deficiency judgment three judges thought that as to the personal liability of
the mortgage guarantors there was an issue of fact which had to be tried by
a jury under the constitution; four judges thought that after the foreclosure
suit no issue of fact remains, only "an arithmetical calculation").23The section expressly preserves all equitable powers of the court, including the
power to balance the equities and to award damages in lieu of an injunction.
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traditional equity jurisdiction, there was no right to trial by jury, although
issues were sometimes framed and sent to the law courts for jury determina-
tion "for the purpose of informing the conscience of the court."24
Since the action would now be under the new section,25 the trial by jury
requirement of the Civil Practice Act pertaining to actions in ejectment 2o
might not apply. But what of the constitutional guarantee of the right of trial
by jury?
The New York Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury in all cases
where it was used as a matter of right either at the time the constitutional
provision was first adopted in 1777, or at the time of any of the subsequent
readoptions of that provision down to 1938.27 ' In answer to the question
whether a jury trial of the issue of title is required in an action under the new
law, "a page of history," to quote the famous epigram of Holmes, "is worth a
volume of logic."'28 Historical research among the chancery reports of New
York must furnish the answer. In New York, from the time of the earliest
extant reports until the abolition of the Court of Chancery, July 5, 1847, the
legal title to land had to be established at law before equity would take juris-
diction and protect the rights of ownership.2 9
24Hampson v. Hampson, 3 V. & B. 41, 35 Eng. Rep. 395 (Lord Chancellor Eldon,
1814); Smith v. Carll, 5 Johns, Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1821) (Chancellor Kent). The facts
were usually directed to be tried at the bar of the Court of King's Bench, or at the
assizes, upon a feigned issue. Matters of law, especially questions concerning real prop-
erty, were often sent to the King's Bench or the Common Pleas for the opinion of the
common law judges. 3 BL. Comm. *452-3.
2-'N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 539.26N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 425, see note 16 supra. There are now two actions in New
York for the recovery of the possession of real property: (1) an action in ejectment,
and (2) an action under the new section. Prior to the enactment of the latter, there
was only ejectment, in which action issues of fact were triable by a jury. In an action
for the recovery of real property, the main issue to be tried is still the title to the land.
By calling part of "Tweedledum" "Tweedledee," it is difficult to see how the require-
ment of trial by jury pertaining to "Tweedledum" has been eliminated.27The New York Constitution, until the revision of 1938, provided that "trial by jury
in all cases in which- it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever." (N. Y.
CoxsT. of 1777, Art. XLI; N. Y. CONST. of 1821, Art. VII, § 2; N. Y. CoNsT. of 1846,
Art. I, § 2; N. Y. CoNsT. of 1894, Art. I, § 2). In 1938, the words "guaranteed by
constitutional provision" were substituted for the word "used." The effect of the re-
current re-enactment of the provision has been to guarantee the continuance of jury
trial in cases where it was used in 1777 and "by each successive enactment to extend
the constitutional guarantee to new classes of cases." Mayers, The Constitutional Guar-
antee of Jury Trial in New York (1937) 7 B0ooL vN L. REv. 180, 182. The focal dates
from which to examine New York practice are April 20, 1777, January 17, 1822,
November 3, 1846, and November 6, 1894; English practice, April 19, 1775, although
the influence thereafter of the English chancellors, notably Lord Eldon, must not be
underestimated.2 8 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 41 Sup. Ct. 506, 507 (1901).
"In cases where a new cause of action is established, the attempt is ordinarily made to
analogize with existing actions, and rule on the right to trial by jury on the basis of
such an analogy." Problems Relating to tire Bill of Rqhts and the General Welfare,
6 N. Y. State Constitutional Convention Committee 20 (1938).2 9 For a possible explanation of the rule, see 4 CoKE, INs". *84, where is found the
statement, "This Court of Equity . . . is no Court of Record, and . . . it can bind but
the person only, and neither the estate of the Defendant's lands, nor property of his
goods or chattels," derived from Y. B. Hil. T. 37 Hen. VI, f. 13, pl. 3 (1458) and
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Assuming that there is a constitutional right to a jury trial in cases under
the new law-and whether there is depends, in final analysis, upon whether the
Court of Appeals examines what courts of equity did over a century and a
half ago, or what some modern writers suggest courts of equity might then
have done30 -what has been accomplished by the recent enactment? As here-
tofore, while the note of issue may be filed in the Special Term, the defendant
may still insist on his right to a jury determination of title and have the case
transferred to the Trial Term where it would proceed as an action at law.3 '
After the jury has decided the issue of title, the judge can frame the judgment
in the form of an equitable decree for an "injunction directing the removal"
of the encroaching structure.32  If the defendant fails to obey the injunction,
he can be punished for contempt of court. The rule of City of Syracuse v.
Hogau as interpreted in Johnson v. Purpura34 would render the defendant
punishable for contempt if the judgment for the plaintiff in ejectment could
not be executed, even though the Civil Practice Act would seem to make no
provision for contempt proceedings in such a case.3 5 Thus the fate for the
recalcitrant defendant has not been changed; the sanction of imprisonment
for contempt remains the same; the theory under which the sanction is applied
has been improved. The total effect of the new statute is to make available
to the owner of any legal estate in land36 equitable relief, in the form of a
Y. B. Trin. 27 Hen. VIII, f. 15, pl. 6 (1535). The rule was well-established in
England. Whitechurch v. Hide, 2 Atk. 391, 26 Eng. Rep. 636 (Lord Chancellor Hard-
wicke, 1742) ; Weller v. Smeaton, 1 Bro. C. C. 572, 28 Eng. Rep. 1304 (Lord Chancellor
Thurlow, 1784) ; Pillsworth v. Hopton, 6 Ves. 51, 31 Eng. Rep. 933 (Lord Chancellor
Eldon, 1801). The rule was abolished in England by statute in 1862. See note 9 smpra.
3 0 It has been said that the rule requiring a determination of title before equity would
take jurisdiction was not a limit upon the existence of equity jurisdiction but only a
limit upon its exercise as a matter of convenience and expediency. 1 AMES, CASES ON
EQUITY JURISDICTION (1904) 515, n. 2; CLARx, PR NcIPLES OF EQUITY (1919) §§ 192,
193; 5 POMEROY, EQuITY JURiSPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1920. Whether the reason
is attributed to lack of power of the court of equity or policy is immaterial. The fact
remains that where equity refused to intervene, the issues were tried at law before a
jury. Trial by jury was consistently used; that is all the Constitution of New York
requires as a condition precedent to render the right to trial by jury "inviolate forever."
It is unfortunate that modern procedure must be shaped by deductions from century-old
reports-especially in an era in which the right to trial by jury has come to be regarded
as less fundamental than it once was. Should the courts desire not to be bothered with
the necessity of calling a jury for the purpose of determining legal ownership, they
would have to find at least a smattering of authority to the effect that juries, where
the right to trial by jury was not waived, were not always used to try disputed titles.
It would not be difficult to find support in dicta; and the more modern the dicta, the
stronger the assertion.3 1If the defendant fails to object to trial at the Special Term, he waives his right
to a jury trial.. N. Y. Civ. PRAc.' AcT § 426.3 2 This is the procedure approved by the minority in Johnson v. Pirpura, supra note 1.
Clark, Trial of Actions under the Code (1926) 11 CORNELL L. Q. 482; Clark, The Union
of Law and Equity (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 1.
3 3Siepra note 1.3 4S.pra note 1.
35N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT §§ 504, 505. See note 17 supra.
3 6REPORT, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY OF THE LAw REvISION CoMmISSIoN [Legis.
Docum. (1942) No. 65 (c)], pp. 23-5. Ejectment can be maintained only by the holder
of a possessory estate.
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mandatory injunction or in lieu thereof damages, as an alternative to ejectment
regardless of the adequacy of that or any other legal remedy.
It is submitted that, aside from making this relief available to the owner of a
future estate, the same result accomplished by the recent enactment might
better have been achieved by amending Section 405 of the Civil Practice Act3 7
to authorize contempt proceedings where it is not practicable to enforce by
execution a judgment for the plaintiff in an action of ejectment. Such an
amendment would have made the statute read as the Court of Appeals in City
of Syracuse v. Hogan.38 thought it read; it would have avoided any question
of jury trial since its effect would have been limited to the enforcement of a
judgment after a trial in ejectment, in which both Constitution and statute
clearly require a trial by jury.
Harry George Henn
Real Property: Estates by the entirety: Right after separation to account-
ing of rents.-In the case of Wakefield v. Wakefield, 25 A. (2d) 841 (Pa.
Super. 1942), plaintiff instituted an equity proceeding for an accounting by
her husband of rents, which accrued after separation, from real estate held
as tenants by the entireties. After separation the defendant leased the real
estate so held, collected the rents, and refused to pay over to the plaintiff
any portion of the net income derived therefrom. There was no allegation
of an intent to defraud; nor was it averred that the husband was using the
rents so derived for his individual use, that he was not supporting the plain-
tiff, or that the-plaintiff contributed her own funds for the purchase of the
property. The bill was dismissed in the lower court and plaintiff appealed
to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania where the sole question for the con-
sideration of the court was whether she could maintain her bill on these
facts. The court held that she could not, saying that "the legal unity of
husband and wife still remains, and the husband has the entire use and the
wife has the entire use, for there are no moities between husband and wife,
where the real estate has been conveyed to and held by them as tenants by
entireties. (Citing cases.) While the marriage subsists it makes no difference
which of the parties leases the property and obtains the rents; the leasing
by either is for the benefit of them in that relation. (Citing cases.) Conse-
quently . . . neither could require an accounting by the other of the rents
from the real estate owned by them as tenants by entireties."
This decision seems in accord with the general conception of the tenancy
by the entirety prevailing in Pennsylvania, where the common law incidents
of estates by entireties have been adopted virtually unchanged.2 Under the
Pennsylvania view, during coverture, no action of partition, or waste, or
37See note 17 supra.
3 8 See note 1 mipra.
'25 A. (2d) at 843.
2 Gasner v. Pierce et at., 286 Pa. 529, 134 AtI.. 494 (1926); Gillan's Ex'rs v. Dixon
et at., 65 Pa. 395 (1870) ; McCurdy et al. v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39, 27 A. L. R. 830 (1870);
French v. Mehan, 56 Pa. 286, 27 A. L. R. 826 (1867).
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account, or ejectment can be maintained by one spouse against the other.8
However, in the given situation-separation-adherence to this traditional
conception is open to attack on two grounds. In the first place, it depends
upon the fiction that two persons can be absolute owners of the same thing
at the same time. This is obviously impossible because the "absolute" owner-
ship of one necessarily infringes upon the "absolute" ownership of the
other. In the second place it ignores realities when it maintains that it makes
no difference which spouse leases the property and collects the rents since it
is for the benefit of the other. Obviously if this statement were true there
would never have been any litigation between the parties. This theory,
moreover, violates a cardinal principle of law by tending to induce breaches
of the peace. By its decision the court encourages a race for possession and
ultimately the forceable ejectment of the speedier spouse by the tardier ar-
rival-an ejectment for which there is no redress in the Pennsylvania courts. 4
Nor is the decision in the instant case in accord with several lower court
decisions on this precise point which have attempted to avoid the undesirable
consequences of a logical development of the common law conception of
tenancies by the entireties. The first case in Pennsylvania of a wife suing
her husband after separation for an accounting of rents from an estate by
the entireties was Hahn v. Hahn,5 where it was decided that while the prop-
erty was held per tout et non per my, the income was held by moiety. How-
ever, this case might be distinguished on the ground that the husband refused
to support his wife and was evidently using the rents for his own purposes.
In two other recent cases where the wife had left the husband she was al-
lowed to maintain a bill in equity against her husband to recover her share
of the rents collected, by him from the property.8 In one of these cases,
Krizovenisky v. Krizovenisky,7 it was averred that the wife had contributed
to the purchase of the property, but in Stevews v. Stevens, 8 there was no
allegation that the wife had contributed to the purchase price, or that the
husband had applied the rents to his own use, or that he had failed to sup-
port his wife, or that he had shown an intent to defraud. The husband has
been held accountable to his wife for one-half the value of real estate held
by the entireties when sold by the husband. 9 Even where the spouses were
3Stuckey v. Keefe's Ex'rs, 26 Pa. 397, 400, 401, 43 A. L. R. 1082 (1856).4 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, § 111, permits a wife to sue or be sued.
However, in Koenig v. Koenig, 29 Lanc. 133 (Pa. 1912), this section was construed
not to give the wife power to bring ejectment against her husband when the property
involved was held by them as an estate by the entirety. Accord, Stuckey v. Keeffe's
Ex'rs, supra note 3.
52 Erie 2 (Pa. 1920).
6Krizovenisky v. Krizovenisky, 13 D. & C. 608 (Pa. 1930), where the court said at
p. 610, "The rule where parties are separated but not divorced, as here, has not ex-
plicitly been laid down by the appellate courts of Pennsylvania. The same practical
and equitable considerations which the Supreme Court in the O'Malley case, (272 Pa.
at 534, 535), set forth as a basis for permitting a suit by one against the other after
divorce to recover rentals, would seem applicable to a case where the parties are sepa-
rated but not divorced." Accord, Stevens v. Stevens, 22 D. & C. 696 (Pa. 1935).
Supra note 6.8lbid.9Zwolski v. Zwolski, 75 Pitts. L. J. 534 (Pa. 1927).
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not separated the wife was allowed to sue for a bill sequestering the rents
and having the income applied to the interest on encumbrances.' However,
here there was an intent to defraud since the husband was using the rents
for his own purposes instead of paying the interest on the mortgage and
thus he was jeopardizing his wife's interest in the property.
In other jujrisdictions courts have recognized that where the parties have
separated, although the change in their status has not been adjudicated, they
can no longer enjoy the joint benefits which were contemplated by the joint
ownership.:" Thus it has been held that a wife who had left her husband
-was entitled to an accounting of income collected by him from the tenancy.:2
In a New Jersey case, Neubeck v. Neubeck,33 a wife who had deserted her
husband without cause and was living in adultery was permitted to sue for
her one-half share of the rents from the common property. In a New York
case a wife was not only permitted to make her separated husband account
for one-half of previously collected rents but as to the future rents was
enabled, after due notice to the tenant, to have her one-half interest paid
directly to her.' 4 As the wife can sue for an accounting, so may the husband
where the wife is in possession and has collected the rents.' 5
In the leading case in New Jersey, Buttlar v. Rosenblath,36 it was held
that in estates by the entireties the parties are looked upon as tenants in
common or joint tenants of the use with the right of survivorship,17 each
being entitled to one-half of the rents and profits during the joint lives, with
power to each to charge his or her moiety during the same period.' 8 Not
only is each spouse entitled to one-half of the rents and profits but he or
she, during coverture, can enforce this right by bringing a bill of account-
ing.19 Consequently, in the jurisdictions which adhere to this view a wife
'OAaron v. Aaron, 72 Pitts. L. J. 384 (Pa. 1924), where the court said: "The appli-
cation of the Married Women's Acts to the common law estate by entireties, as well
as the introduction of divorces a vinculo matrimoni upon grounds arising after marriage,
which was unknown to the common law, have given rise to some curious not to say
absurd, situations. The common law rules as to estates by entireties conflict so directly
with modern statutory rules as to the rights of married women, that some of them must
give way and it is plain that the statutory rules must prevail over those which are
derived from the common law."
'
1 Rush v. Rush, 258 N. Y. Supp. 913, 915 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
'
2 0'Connell v. O'Connell, 93 N. J. Eq. 603, 117 Ati. 634 (1922); Rush v. Rush,
supra note 11.
'
3 Neubeck v. Neubeck, 94 N. J. Eq. 167, 119 Atl. 26 (1922).
14T. G. W. Realties Co. v. Long Island Bird Store, 151 Misc. 918, 272 N. Y. Supp.
601 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (wife was only allowed an accounting of rents from time she first
demanded her share from her husband; court held that prior to the demand her actions
had constituted a waiver and she was estopped to demand her one-half interest).
15 Fielding v. Barr, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 148, 263 App. Div. 779 (3d Dep't 1941).
1642 N. J. Eq. 651, 9 Atl. 695 (1887).
'
7 Goodrich v. Village of Otego, 216 N. Y. 112, 110 N. E. 162 (1915).
18 Buttlar v. Rosenblath, supra note 17; Hiles v. Fisher-, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E.
337 (1895) ; Goodrich v. Village of Otego, supra note 17; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPER'rY
(3d ed. 1939) § 435; 4 THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. ed. 1940) § 1817.
1 9 Nobile v. Bartletta et al., 109 N. J. Eq. 119, 156 Atl. 483 (1931), where the court
said: "It seems to be well settled in this state that, where the title to lands rests in
a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, the wife holds in her possession during
their joint lives one-half of the estate in common with her husband, and as between
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can sue for an accounting after separation.2 0
However, there are several other states which support the view expounded
by the court in the principal case. North Carolina refuses to recognize that
a'separation so changes the marital status as to permit a violation of one
of the common law incidents of such estates.21 In one of the first reported
cases in Missouri the court held that the common law incidents of tenancies
by the entireties are not dissolved by a separation.22 This view is still the
law in Missouri.23 In a recent case in Delaware the court held that it had
no power to decree a general accounting, nor to draw the distinction between
the right to receive the rents from an estate by the entirety after the separa-
tion of the husband and wife and the right to receive such rents before the
date of such separation.24 These courts follow the Pennsylvania doctrine
that it is immaterial which spouse leases the property and collects the rents
since the leasing by either is for the benefit of both.
Massachusetts adheres to a still different theory and not only retains the
common law conception of estates by the entireties prevailing in Pennsyl-
vania, but goes so far as to hold that the Married Women's Acts do not
apply to such estates and thus the husband ,is entitled to all the rents and
profits from the real estate so owned.25
Today in all jurisdictions, with the exception of Arkansas, 26 either by
decision or by statute,2 7 a divorce a vinculo terminates the estate, 28 the
spouses holding as tenants in common and either one may sue for an ac-
themselves, the respective rights are those of tenants in common, and the wife is en-
titled to an accounting of the rents collected from the common property." O'Connell
v. O'Connell, supra note 12; Neubeck v. Neubeck, supra note 13.20Neubeck v. Neubeck, supra note 13; O'Connell v. O'Connell, mtpra note 12; T. G. W.
Realties Co. v. Long Island Bird Store, supra note 14; Rush v. Rush, supra note 11.2 1Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N. C. 581, 92 S. E. 486 (1917) (with two strong dissenting
opinions).22Gonsolis v. Donchouquette, I Mo. 666 (1826).
231. R. Goldberg Supply Co. v. Taylor, 209 Mo. App. 98, 237 S. W. 900 (1922).2 4 Sidwell v. Sidwell, 35 Del. 322, 165 Atl. 334 (1933).2 5 Cooley v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 75 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 1st 1935) where the court
said: "Under the law of Massachusetts the husband is entitled, not only to all the
income of personal property held by the spouses as tenants by the entirety, but to all
the receipts and profits from the real estate so held." Voight v. Voight, 252 Mass.
582, 147 N. E. 887 (1925) (court held that at common law the right to possession of
an estate by entireties during the joint lives of the husband and wife is in the husband
and such right is not taken away by the Married Women's Property Act) ; Cunning-
ham v. Ganley, 267 Mass. 375, 166 N. E. 712 (1929) ; Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219,
4 N. E. 824 (1886).2 6Ward v. Ward, 186 Ark. 196; 53 S. W. (2d) 8 (1932). Even in Arkansas where
divorce does not terminate an estate by entireties it is held that after divorce a wife
is entitled to receive one-half the rents of such property so long as both live, but upon
the death of either the entire property goes to the survivor. Roulston v. Hall, 66 Ark.
305, 50 S. W. 690 (1899).2 7Formerly both Michigan and Pennsylvania were in the minority with Arkansas.
Allen v. Allen, 196 Mich. 292, 162 N. W. 987 (1917) ; Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66
AtI. 81 (1907). However, in both states this view was changed by statute to conform
with that of the majority. MicHi. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1935) § 25.132; PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 68, § 501.
282 TrFFAN, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 436; 4 TioMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY
(Perm. ed. 1940) § 1814.
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counting.29 There seems no reason why a separation should not be treated
in the same manner as a divorce. 80 Except for the formality of a legal dis-
solution of the marriage ties, separated parties stand in the same relation to
one another in many respects as if they were divorced. Instead of the atti-
tude of cooperation and mutual confidence which is essential to the full
enjoyment of property owned by the entireties, there is frequently positive
animosity. Just because the law says that, despite separation, one spouse
collects the rents for the benefit of the other does not make it so. By refus-
ing to allow one spouse to bring a bill of accounting because a divorce has
not been procured, the court in the principal case is refusing adequately to
protect a right which it has held properly belongs to the spouse-namely,
the right to one-half of the rents and profits. Those courts are to be com-
mended which have refused to allow the ancient common law conception
of entireties to force them to such an impractical and unjust conclusion.
George Edward Cotter
Rule against Perpetuities: Interests subject to the rule: Option con-
tracts: Preemptive rights.-The rule against perpetuities is a rule against
remoteness of vesting of possible future interests in property.' It is a rule to
prevent the vesting of future ownership at a time too remote and is not merely
a policy against unreasonable restraints on alienation.2 Both the rule against
perpetuities and the policy against unreasonable restraints on alienation are
an outgrowth of a public policy favoring the free alienability of property,3
2921 Cyc. 1201; 13 R. C. L. 1121-1123; Notes (1896) 30 L. R. A. 333; (1907) 10
L. R. A. (N. s.) 463; L. R. A. 1915C 396.
3 OKrizovenisky v. Krizovenisky, supra note 6, where the court said at p. 610: "The
same practical and equitable considerations which the Supreme Court in the O'Malley
case, (272 Pa. 534, 535), set forth as a basis for permitting a suit by one against the
other after divorce to recover rentals, would seem applicable to a case where the parties
are separated but not divorced." Accord, Stevens v. Stevens, supra note 6.
'A perpetuity is a "future limitation, whether executory or by way of remainder, and
of real or personal property, which is not to vest until after the expiration of, or which
will not necessarily vest within, the period prescribed by the law for the creation of
future estates, and which is not destructible by the person for the time being entitled to
the property subject to the future limitation, except with the concurrence of the person
interested in the contingent event." Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 353, 92 Atl. 312 (1914).
GRAY, RULE AGAINST PFET-uiriEs (4th ed. 1942); N. Y. Law Revision Comm. Leg.
Doe. (1936) No. 65(H) ; Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell (1938) 51 HAv. L. REv. 638.2
"The tying up of property, the taking it out of commerce, can be accomplished either,
first, by restraining the alienation of interests in it, or, secondly, by postponing to a
remote period the arising of future interests." GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 119. In
Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 527, 107 Atl. 138 (1919), the court said of
this statement: "This language points clearly to the distinction between direct restraints
on alienation which are invalid, when inconsistent with the legal incidents of. the estate
granted, though they operate for a day only; and indirect restraints on alienation which
the law tolerates within the limits of the rule against perpetuities."3Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 5th 1936) ; Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W,
Va. 193, 85 S. E. 170 (1915) : Barton v. Thaw, supra note 1.. Abbot, Leases and the
Rule Against Perpetuities (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 878, 882.
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but each achieves the desired result by different means.4
The rule against perpetuities is a rule of property law and not of contract
law.5 It affects contracts only in as much as they create or attempt to create
interests in property. The fact that obligations under a contract may not arise
within the period allowed by the rule does not bring the contract within the
scope of the rule.
The question of the applicability of the rule against perpetuities to option
contracts to purchase property has occasioned some dispute and confusion.,
Options to purchase realty, when appendant to a lease, have been sustained
in a few American jurisdictions,7 whereas options for renewal in leases have
been sustained almost universally. 8 On the other hand, unlimited options in
4Many courts have failed to see that the rule against perpetuities applies to any
property interest, alienable or inalienable, that may vest at a time too remote. This has
caused some confusion and the rule has been applied to invalidate interests which should
have been tested by the policy against unreasonable restraints on the alienation of prop-
erty and vice versa. That the rule applies to limitations other than those tying up prop-
erty, see GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 2.1, 268, 269.
5In the leading case of Walsh v. Secretary of State for India, 10 H. L. 367 (1863),
Lord Clive had transferred a sum of money to the East India Company which the com-
pany promised to repay to Clive or his representatives upon the happening of certain
conditions. Many years later these conditions happened and suit was brought on the
covenant. The court held that the covenant was valid and enforceable even though the
condition upon which the promise was dependent might not happen within the time
allowed by the rule.
A contract transferring a bus route in which the transferee was to make payments
to the transferor and no time limit was expressed was held valid in Kennedy v. Mc-
Mullen, 39 S. W. (2d) 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). The court held that the rule did
not apply.
A contract to divide profits when certain property is sold is not subject to the rule,
though no time limit is placed on the contract. Bennett v. Bennett, 92 W. Va. 391, 115
S. E. 436 (1922).
Personal contracts are not subject to the rule. Southern Ry. v. Associated Portland
Cement Mf'rs., [1910] 1 Ch. 12.
An option for the first refusal of certain lands in case the offeror ever decided to use
the lands for dock purposes is not within the scope of the rule. Manchester Ship Canal
Co. v. Manchester Race Course, [1901] 2 Ch. 37.
A provision in a company's charter that a stockholder upon demand must transfer his
shares to certain persons is a personal contract and thus not within the scope of the rule.
Borland's Trustee v. Steel Bros. & Co., [1901] 1 Ch. 279.
OAbott, op. cit. supra note 3; Rood, Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities (1917)
28 CASE & COMMlrENT 835; Langeluttig, Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities (1930)
17 VA. L. REv 459. Note (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 77.7 Prout v. Roby, 15 Wall. 471 (U. S. 1872) (sustained option to purchase land con-
tained in ninety-nine year lease without discussing the rule) ; Blakeman v. Miller, 136
Cal. 138, 68 Pac. 587 (1902) (option to purchase in lease held not to violate statute
limiting suspension of alienation) ; Keogh v. Peck, 16 Ili. 318, 147 N. E. 266 (1925)
(court specifically enforced option to purchase appendant to a lease) ; Hollander v.
Central Metal Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442 (1908) (court specifically enforced option
to purchase appendant to a ninety-nine year lease) : Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207 (1876) ;
Haeoar v. Buck, 44 Vt. 285 (1872) (court specifically enforced option appendant to a
ninety-nine year lease without mentioning the rule).
In England such contracts have been held void because of the rule. Woodall v.
Clifton, [1905] 2 Ch. 257. One English case has distinguished a suit in equity, for the
specific performance of an option contract, from a suit at 'law for damageps. and in the
latter case enforced the covenant. Worthing Corp. v. Heather, L. R. [19061 2 Ch. 532.
SThis type of option is a recognized exception to the rule. Orr v. Doubleday, Page
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gross to purchase realty have generally been held void.9 Options to purchase
stock (personalty) have been sustained' except where they have conflicted
with the policy against unreasonable restraints on alienation." In every one
of these option contract cases the problem is the same: the possibility of a
property interest arising on a remote contingency.' 2
In Landon & South Western Ry. v. Goinvn,' 3 an option in gross, reserved
by the grantor of the land, was held to be void as a violation of the rule against
perpetuities and specific performance was refused. The English courts based
their decision partly on the ground that the reservation was ultra vires under
certain statutes.' This decision as to the violation of the rule has been fol-
lowed in American jurisdictions; it is the accepted view in both England and
America' 5 that such an option creates a contingent interest in land subject
to the rule. Some American courts have held options in gross void on grounds
other than the rule or the policy against unreasonable restraints, 16 and others
& Co., 233 N. Y. 334, 119 N. E. 552 (1918) ; Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E.
983 (1914).9 0n this point the rule is the same in England and the United States. London &
South Western R. Co. v. Gomm, [1882] 20 Ch. Div. 562; Rider v. Ford, 129 L. T. R.
347 (1923), Note (1924) 9 CORNELL L. Q. 220; Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, supra note 2;
Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918) ; Turner v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870,
113 S. E. 585 (1922) (court refused to place its decision squarely on the rule in holding
an unlimited option to purchase land void); Bauer v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 209 Ill. 316,
70 N. E. 634 (1904) [contract for perpetual option for easement held unenforceable:
(1) because specific performance is a matter of discretion, (2) because of laches as the
holder did not exercise his option within six years, and (3) because the contract lacked
mutuality]; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (1892); Eastman Marble
Co. v. V~rmont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 518, 128 N. E. 177 (1920); Barton v. Thaw,
supra note 1; In re Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 Atl. 392 (1922) ; Starcher v. Duty,
61 W. Va. 373, 56 S. E. 524 (1923); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S. E. 170(1915).
10 Lawson v. Household Finance Co., 17 Del. Ch. 1, 147 Atl. 312 (1929) : New England
Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432 (1894) ; Nicholson v. Franklin Brew-
ing Co., 82 Ohio 94, 91 N. E. 991 (1910).
"lGreen v. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. (2d) 249 (1938).
12A contract for the sale of real property which is not performed immediately is not
within the rule as the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time.
However, when the vendee can call for a conveyance only upon the fulfillment of a
condition which may be too remote, the contract is unenforceable. Horticultural Devel-
opment Co. v. Lark, 224 Ala. 193, 139 So. 229 (1932).
Options unlimited in time have been held valid in jurisdictions where there are statutes
against suspension of the power of alienation. Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68 Pac.
587 (1902) : Matter of City of New York, 246 N. Y. 1, 157 N. E. 911 (1927). Cf.
Matter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 24 N. E. (2d) 322 (1939) (gift to nephews if found
within two years of death of testator. and if not found, to named charities; attempted
gift to charities was void). In New York both the rule against perpetuities and the rule
against suspension of the power of alienation are in effect. REAL PROP. LAW § 42;
PERS. PROP. LAW § 11. N. Y. Law Revision Comm. supra note 1 at 76 et seq. The
measuring period is two lives in being and no gross period is permitted. But option
contracts measured in terms of years are held valid.
1320 Ch. Div. 562 (1882).
14 The fact that the court based its decision upon two grounds shows it was hesitant
to rely solely on the rule. Langeluttig, op. cit. supra note 6 at 467.
15Euolra note 9.
16Bauer v. Lumaghi Coal Co., su,5ra note 9. This case involved a perpetual option
to purchase an easement. The court refused to enforce the option on the grounds that
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have evaded the issue by placing their decisions on both the rule and the
policy against unreasonable restraints on alienation. 17 The reason for this
vacillation lies in the fact that the rule was not created to deal with the type
of interest created by an option contract, and yet the courts think that some
time limit should be placed on these contracts. They may prevent the devel-
opment of land and to some extent restrict the alienability of property, as a
person is reluctant to purchase property in which his estate may be cut off
at any time.'8 Technically they are a violation of the rule. When no definite
time for the exercise of the option is provided, the courts may imply a reason-
able time and, where possible, uphold the contract. However, where the time
is stated in the contract and it is for an unreasonably long period it seems
advisable to hold such options void. The option in gross can be held void
on two grounds. An exercise of the option will create an interest in property
which may not vest within the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities;
since the rule is one of public policy it can be applied to such interests. Use
of the policy against unreasonable restraints on the alienation of property may
be a more desirable yardstick in this situation because it would permit each
case to be tried on its own facts and a reasonable time limit, though violating
the rule against perpetuities, could be upheld. This type of interest is in
conflict with the policy against unreasonable restraints because it ties up
property and makes it less salable.
In Worthing Corporation v. Heather,'9 an English nisi prius judge at-
tempted to make a distinction between suits in equity to enforce specifically
an option for the purchase of realty and suits at law for damages for the
breach of such a covenant. It was held that to give specific performance would
violate the rule but that it would be proper to give damages for the breach.
The court reasoned that by ordering specific performance the option holder
was given an equitable interest in land and that it was this interest which was
offensive to the rule. In a suit at law for damages, however, the option holder
derived no interest in land and so the rule was not applicable.2 0 This dis-
tinction fails to recognize a practical factor. By enforcing the option contract
at law the court is in effect coercing the property owner into carrying out
the contract or be subject to a suit for damages. If the optionor carries out
the contract, to avoid liability, an interest will vest that is objectionable to
the rule. No such distinction between suits at law or in equity has been made
in the American decisions.
In England options to purchase appendant to a lease have been afforded
the same treatment as options in gross. In Woodall v. Clifton,2'1 the court
specific performance was a matter of discretion, a lapse of six years in exercising the
option amounted to laches, and the contract lacked mutuality. Turner v. Peacock, supra
note 9. In this case the court refused to base its decision on any specific grounds in
holding an unlimited option to purchase land void.
l7Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., Winsor v. Mills, Skeen v. Clinchfield,
Woodall v. Bruen, all mrpra note 9.
18A purchaser of land subject to an option, who takes with notice of the option, takes
his interest subject to the option. Parkhurst v. Maynard, 285 Mass. 59, 188 N. E. 510
(1933) ;-Crowley v. Byrne, 71 Wash. 444, 129 Pac. 113 (1912).
19 Supra note 7.20This reasoning has found little or no support in the United States. The case is




failed to recognize the distinction between the effect of an option appendant
and an option in gross and relied on the Gomrn case, which involved an option
in gross, to hold void an option appendant.2 2 In the United States the dis-
tinction has been recognized and options appendant are held not to violate
the rule against perpetuities. Such options are in no way against public
policy, though technically they are within the scope of the rule. This type
of option encourages the person in possession to develop the land and is not
an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Options appendant to renew a lease have been treated as valid and not
within the rule in both England2 and the United States.25 Some attempt is
made to rationalize this result by reasoning that the option of renewal is
merely an incident of an already vested interest in the lessee and it is part
of this interest. This reasoning lacks validity since the interest given by the
option will not vest until the time the lessee exercises his option and until
that time all the lessee has is a term of years with an option to renew his
interest. Practically, there is little difference between a long lease with a power
of termination by the lessee arid a lease with an option of renewal. Tech-
nically, there is a violation of the letter of the rule, but there is no violation
of the policy behind the rule.
The rule is applicable to possible future interests in personalty as well as
realty,26 but there is no case in which an option to purchase stock has been
held void as violating the rule against perpetuities. 27 The courts have been
inclined to test the validity of such options by applying the policy against
unreasonable restraints on alienation rather than the rule. Where such options
are reasonable they have been sustained.2 8  Some courts have gone to the
extent of implying an intention by the parties that the option should last only
for a reasonable time and thus have avoided what would otherwise have been
an unreasonable restraint on alienation.29
22This case was followed by the Worthing Corp. case, supra note 7, and Rider v. Ford,
129 L. T. R. 347 (1923).23Some early cases upheld such options without even discussing the rule. Prout v.
Roby, Hagar v. Buck, both supra note 7. Later cases discussed the rule and held it
to be inapplicable to this type of interest. Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A.
5th 1936) (this type of interest is not within the scope of the rule) ; Keogh v. Peck
(not within the scope of the rule), Hollander v. Central Metal Co. (this type of interest
is an exception to the rule), Banks v. Haskie (exception to the rule), all supra note 7.2 4 Copper Mining Co. v. Beach, 13 Beav. 478 (1823) ; Pollock v. Booth, Ir. R. 9 Eq. 229
(1875) ; Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Ch. Div. 640 (1882).25 0rr v. Doubleday, Page & Co., Thaw v. Gaffney, both supra note 8.2GGrey v. Montagu, 2 Eden 205, 3 B. P. C. (toml. ed.) 314 (bequest of personalty
to take effect after the death of the issue of A) ; Johnson's Trust, L. R. 2 Eq. 716 (1866)
GRAY. op. cit. supra note 1, § 319 et seq.
27The problem was raised in Kingston v. Home Life Insurance Co., 11 Del. Ch. 258,
101 Atl. 898 (1919), but the court held that the rule did not apply to an option to pur-
chase stock.
28Supra note 10.
290ption to return investment bonds to the vendor was held not to be void if exercised
within a reasonable time. Brooks v. Trustee, 76 Wash. 589, 136 Pac. 1152 (1913).
A reasonable time was implied in a contract to purchase a certain amount of coal
annually. M'Kell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 186 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 6th 1911).
Note (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 77.
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In Kingston v. Hane Life Insurance Company,"° there was an option con-
tract to purchase stock, the exercise of which was not limited in point of time.
The plaintiff, a stockholder, brought suit to have the option declared void,
alleging it was in violation of the rule against perpetuities.3l The court, in
rejecting this contention, held that the rule was inapplicable'as its purpose
was mainly to prevent restrictions on the alienation of and/or clouds on the
title of real property and not personal property. The court'admitted that,
where public policy required, the rule would be applied to personalty, but
that it could see no compelling public interest in this type of option. In reach-
ing this decision the court showed an unnecessary reluctance to apply the rule
to personal property.32 Historically the rule is applicable to personalty as
well as realty.33
Certainly, these contracts must be limited and subject to some control
They create a situation whereby an interest in property can vest beyond the
period allowed by the rule and they may act as a restraint on the alienation
of property. One who takes property subject to an option, with knowledge
of the contract, may be liable in tort to the holder of the option for inducing
a breach of contract or for interfering with contractual relations.3 4 The owner
of the property will be liable for a breach of contract. Despite this, these
contracts are often beneficial to the public and to the individuals concerned,
and in the case of a corporation they are often beneficial and protect the
interests of the stockholders. 35 If the rule against perpetuities is to be used
to test their validity, no option lasting for over twenty-one years or lives in
being will be valid, and in New York no option will be valid. In some cases
there may be good reasons why a longer period should be allowed. If the
courts recognize this and, at the same time, realize that the rule is merely
one of public policy and should be invoked only when public policy requires,
much of the chaos and confusion will be eliminated. By testing the validity
of option contracts in the light of the policy against unreasonable restraints
on alienation, the courts should be able to determine the reasonableness of
3011 Del. Ch. 258, 101 Atl. 898 (1919).
31The plaintiff also alleged that the option was void because it interfered with his
pre-emptive right. The court held, on this point, that he bought his stock subsequent
to the issuance of this option and whatever pre-emptive right he had was subject to this
option.3 21n Loring v. Lamson Co., 249 Mass. 272, 143 N. E. 916 (1924), it was held that
an option to purchase stock does not create an interest in property.
By statute in New York the rule is made applicable to personal property. N. Y. PERS.
PROP. LAW § 11.
MSupra note 27.
:34Cumberland Glass Manufacturing Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 87 Atl. 927 (1913);
Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907) ; American Malting Co. v.
Keitel, 209 Fed. 351 (C. C. A. 2d 1913). PRossER, TORTS (1941) § 104.35An option giving the corporation the first opportunity to purchase stock to be sold
by its shareholders was held to be in the interest of the corporation and would promote
the welfare of the stockholders. Lawson v. Household Finance Co., 17 Del. Ch. 1, 147
AtI. 312 (1929), and cases cited smpra note 10.
Where the directors of a corporation have the discretionary power to require the
shareholders to sell to the corporation there is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The practical effect of such a restraint is to prevent a sale to anyone but the corporation.
Green v. Rollins & Sons, Inc., supra note 11.
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the option on the particular facts of each case; a reasonable period, though
lasting longer than the period allowed by the rule could, in a proper case, be
sustained. The uncertainty inherent in this proposal should not prove to be
an insuperable difficulty. Richard E. Macey
